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ABSTRACT

Uncertain Justice: The Ute Jurisdiction Case and Conflicting
Directions in Federal Indian Law

by

A. J. Taylor, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 1995

Major Professor: Dr. Clyde A. Milner II
Department: History

Questions of jurisdiction over Indian lands between tribal and state
governments constitute some of the most vexing problems in federal Indian law.
The Ute jurisdiction case captures, in one instance, the complexities that surround
this important body of law. Many cases concerning Native American jurisdiction
rights center on disputed interpretations of antiquated federal laws. In the Ute case,
both the State of Utah and the Ute Indian tribe contested the meaning of a series of
congressional acts that opened Ute lands to white settlement at the turn of the
century. The protracted litigation that marked the Ute case revealed many of the
inconsistencies and contradictions that plague the federal courts in their attempts to
resolve jurisdiction controversies. This thesis examines the particulars of the Ute

III

lawsuit and, using it as a vehicle, investigates the limits of the law in deciding
Indian/white jurisdiction disputes.
(132 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: "INDIAN LAW IS STILLBORN"

On 14 October 1975, the Ute Indians and the other residents of the Uintah
Basin reinstigated their war over the lands of eastern Utah. This fight, however,
differed dramatically from the armed conflicts that marked the wars of the midnineteenth century. This time they waged their battle in the courts rather than on
;

the land itself. Instead of Indian warriors and state militia men facing off against
one another, legions of lawyers clashed in this newest contest. At stake in this
twentieth century confrontation was an issue endemic to contemporary Indian/white
relationships: Indian jurisdiction rights.
Claims of state jurisdiction in Indian country stand as a recurrent issue in
federal Indian law. Recent developments in Native American communities point to
the continuing importance of jurisdictional matters in state/tribal relationships.
Aggressive western states' land actions, an increased sense of tribal goals, and
growing friction among the three sovereigns that compete for Indian lands have
produced a new level of tension in Native American/white relations of the late
twentieth century. The tribes, the states, and the federal government compete
vigorously and unevenly for power over Indian lands. The combination of early
twentieth century legislative decisions and contemporary judicial findings serve to
illuminate this most recent chapter in Native American legal history.

2
Between 1959 and 1994, the United States Supreme Court issued more
decisions in Indian cases than during any other comparable period. One might
assume that the Court's sustained attention would have resulted in more conceptual
clarity and predictability. But in the area of jurisdictional disputes this proved far
from true, for the Court has been anything but consistent. Each new decision, in
this area of law, turns on finer points and raises additional questions. 1
Beginning with the famous 1832 Supreme Court case Worcester v. Georgia,
the Court labored to articulate general principles by which to resolve jurisdiction
~

issues. Currently, significant inconsistencies exist within the Court's rulings, both
as to governing principles and the application of those principles. 2 The justices
themselves have noted the Court's capriciousness. In 1978, Justice William
Rehnquist stated his belief "that a well-defined body of principles is essential in
order to end the need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the
law for a number of years." During a 1981 visit to Boalt Hall Law School at the
University of California, Berkeley, Justice Potter Stewart commented that "any case
the Court decides in Indian law is stillborn and has no precedential value. ,,3

lRobert S. Pelcyger, "Justices and Indians: Back to Basics," Oregon Law
Review 62 (January 1983), 29-30.
2Conference of Western Attorneys General, American Indian Law Deskbook
(Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1993), 98.
3Pelcyger, "Justices and Indians: Back to Basics," 30-31.
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Often, questions that arise over the permissible application of state and tribal
jurisdiction prove extremely complex. To fully comprehend these issues, basic
judicial principles relevant to civil authority need to be identified. Perhaps the best
strategy for isolating such principles involves tracing the historical roots of this body
of law. Several important federal court cases help to delineate the reasoning courts
have used in deciding issues of jurisdictional rights.
Indian tribal jurisdiction and the exclusion of state jurisdictional control over
Indian country derive from two judicially created doctrines: tribal sovereignty and
;

Indian wardship. Both doctrines stem from the opinions of Chief Justice John
Marshall in two cases concerning repeated attempts by the state of Georgia to assert
jurisdiction over the territory of the Cherokee Nation.4 In 1831, the state of

~e concept of Indian wardship originated from the first of these cases,
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. In December 1830, the Cherokees filed suit in the
Supreme Court against the state of Georgia. The Indians asked for an injunction
against Georgia's encroachment on Indian territory in violation of the tribe's treaty
rights. The Cherokees maintained that they were a sovereign nation not subject to
Georgia's territorial jurisdiction and that Geogia's laws were null and void in Indian
country. The Supreme Court dismissed the Indian petition. Rather than look at the
merits of the case, Chief Justice John Marshall instead moved to a "preliminary
inquiry." Marshall did not believe that the Cherokee Nation constituted a foreign
state and seized on the opportunity to clarify the federal government's responsibility
over Indian affairs. He observed that the relationship between the Indians and the
United States government was "unlike that of any two people in existence."
Marshall declared that the Indians composed "domestic, dependent nations" and
noted that they occupied land that existed in a territory that the United States
asserted a title to independent of the Indians' will. He concluded that the Indians'
"relationship to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. " Vine
DelOria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1983), 30-31; Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father:
The United States Government and the American Indians (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1984), 75-76; Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution

4

Georgia convicted two non-Indians of a state crime committed on Cherokee lands.
Reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia held the state
laws as invalid within the lands of the Cherokee Nation and overturned the
.'
5
convIctIOns.

In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall recognized the Cherokee Nation as a
separate political community with geographical boundaries inside which Georgia's
laws held no power. Writing for the majority, Marshall ruled:
Indian nations are distinct political communities possessing internal
sovereignty. They are capable of self-government and ar~ completely
independent of and separate from the states. Hence, state laws cannot
be extended into Indian Country nor may state exercise civil or
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country. 6
The opinion of the Court in Worcester appeared quite clear. The judicial branch
erected a protective barrier insulating Indian tribes from any state intrusion. States
could not extend their laws into Indian country, nor could they assume civil
jurisdiction over matters arising on the reservations. 7 Worcester stood as one of the
Supreme Court's most lasting statements; judges still cite it in modem Indian law
decisions.

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 14; William C. Canby, Jr., "Civil Jurisdiction
and the Indian Reservation," Utah Law Review 206 (Summer 1973), 206.
SStephen M. Feldman, "Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause,"
Oregon Law Review 64 (OCtober 1986), 670.
~orcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).

7Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice, 204.
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In spite of Marshall's opinion, the difficulties confronting Indian/state
relations did not evaporate, but rather grew over time. Tribal fears of state
intrusion proved real and not mere figments of the Indian imagination. The quest
for Indian land, economic competition, and the lack of understanding by both whites
and Indians of one another's culture all contributed to a troubled relationship
between reservations and white settlements. Recent history has witnessed a drift
away from the protective shield Marshall provided in Worcester.
The initial erosion of the Worcester bar to state power in Indian country
;

appeared in an important decision, Williams v. Lee. In this 1959 Arizona case, the
state superior court exercised civil jurisdiction over a case in which a non-Indian
sought to collect an overdue debt for goods he had sold to an Indian couple on the
Navajo reservation. Since the Navajos had their own tribal court system, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that Arizona could not extend its jurisdiction over the
reservation. 8 Justice Hugo Black, speaking for the majority, articulated a test for
states that hoped to obtain jurisdiction over Indian country:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction
here [Arizona] would undermine the authority of tribal courts over
reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of Indians to
govern themselves. 9
Thus, according to this decision, a state could take jurisdiction if it did not interfere
with the right of the tribe to govern itself.

8John Wunder, Retained by the People: A History of the American Indians
and the Bill of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 110.
~illiams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 223 (1959).

Williams v. Lee signaled a departure

f~om

6
the 1832 Worcester decision. The

Worcester decision established a high, almost impregnable, protective buffer.
According to Williams, if state encroachment did not "infringe" on tribal selfgovernment, the state might extend its jurisdiction onto the reservation. 10
Williams marked a watershed decision for two reasons. First, for decades
the Supreme Court had rendered Indian law decisions on an individual basis. The
Court struggled through cases without clearly articulating the development of the
Worcester doctrine. After Williams, the pace of Indian law decisions handed down
by the Supreme Court increased dramatically. Second, Williams presented the
Court with its first case that dealt with Indian issues in a modem context. During
the quarter century following Williams, the dominant issue in Indian country
focused on the steadily increasing exertions of authority by tribal governments and
accompanying tribal resistance to state jurisdiction. 11
By 1962, a new problem arose, concerning which law enforcement
authorities held jurisdiction in areas where contiguous state and tribal lands
intermingled. Confusion abounded. In many areas, the boundaries between Indian
country and state land overlapped, adding to jurisdictional murkiness.

lOClifford M. Lytle, "The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and
Continuing Problems of State Encroachment into Indian Country," American Indian
Law Review 8 (January 1977), 73.
11Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies
in a Modem Constitutional Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987),
2-3.

7
To understand the difficulties attached to clarifying reservation boundaries,
one must tum to late-nineteenth-century federal Indian policy. Support for the
allotment in severalty of Indian land fueled federal policy of the era. 12 Despite the
power it exerted over Indian/white relations for nearly half a century, the Dawes
Act, the cornerstone of federal Indian policy, supplied little more than a statement of
intent. The act contained no timetables and few instructions for implementation.
The Dawes Act authorized, but did not require, the president to open reservation
land for allotment. The act merely granted him the discretionary power to open the
;

lands. The failure of the president to act on this power prompted Congress
occasionally to enact special legislation to assure the opening of a particular
reservation. In fact, Congress enacted 108 separate pieces of legislation directing
the allotment of specific reservations across the nation. 13

l~he upsurge of humanitarian concern for Indian reform after the Civil War

gave a new impetus to the severalty principle, which was almost universally
accepted and aggressively promoted, until Congress passed a general allotment law
in February 1887. Allotment of land in severalty was part of the drive to
individualize and assimilate the Indian into American society--an obsession of the
late-nineteenth century Christian reformers. The dissolution of communal lands by
allotment, together with the citizenship attached to private land-owning framed the
central issue. The Dawes's General Allotment Act constituted the final part of the
government's assimilation campaign. The law established a pathway for the legal,
economic, and social integration of Native Americans into the United States. The act
provided for the end of tribal relationships and stipulated the division of reservations
into family-sized farms, allotted to each Indian. The plan called for each adult
Indian to receive 160 acres, each child 80 acres, and the remaining land to be
declared surplus (or opened) and sold to whites. For further information see:
Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880~ (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 70-71.
13Ibid., 77.
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The methods used to open reservation lands to settlement varied. Some acts
carried out the terms of agreements negotiated with tribes for the cession of surplus
lands, while others, without tribal consent, unilaterally opened surplus lands to
white settlement. Whatever the method, the purpose of the surplus lands acts was to
return the lands to the public domain and thereby allow white settlement under
homesteading and other land disposal laws. While all the acts accomplished this, not
all removed the lands from the reservation. 14 As a result, jurisdiction over "Indian
country" became difficult to define because legislation from the Dawes Act era
;

culminated in the intermingling of white and Indian lands on "old" reservations.
These difficulties continued unattended until more than half-way through the
twentieth century. Early in 1962, a landmark case reached the Supreme Court in
which the central issue concerned the composition of "Indian country." In Seymour
v. Superintendent, officials in Washington State charged a member of the Colville
Indian tribe with burglary committed on the southern half of the Colville Indian
Reservation. After a guilty plea and conviction, Seymour appealed on the grounds
that the southern half of the reservation, composed primarily of fee simple lands
owned by non-Indians, still formed Indian country. If true, then his crime
constituted a federal, rather than a state, offense. IS
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the state court's conviction. In an
opinion written by Justice Hugo Black, the court held that although a congressional

14Western Attorneys General, American Indian Law Deskbook, 47-50.
lSSeymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

9
act of 1906 had "diminished" the southern half of the Colville reservation, it had not

"extinguished" the reservation status. The court found it immaterial that a nonIndian held title to the particular parcel of land in question. 16 After Seymour,
litigation increasingly revolved around the "intent" of Congress in opening
reservations to white settlement at the turn of the century.
This stance by the Supreme Court created new problems. Courts could
rarely find intent to remove reservation status on the face of a particular statute,
since Congress during the era of surplus land acts, anticipated that the reservation
;

system would shortly cease to exist. Congress viewed the process of allotting lands
to tribal members and selling surplus lands to white settlers as the "first step"
toward the ultimate aim of abolishing all Indian reservations. But, in the specific
instance Congress failed to clarify whether an individual piece of legislation
formally sliced a certain parcel of land off a reservation. 17 As a result, the courts
began to base their determinations on the "doctrine of disestablishment." If past
congressional action had disestablished a reservation, the tribe lost jurisdiction. If
the reservation still held its status, the tribe retained jurisdictional authority.
Consequently, courts started to examine the express language of antiquated
legislation pertinent to each case. Instead of struggling with broad philosophical

16Ibid., 352.
17Western Attorneys General, American Indian Law Deskbook, 47-50.
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issues connected to jurisdictional law, this new trend culminated in case-by-case
analysis and reasoning by justices.
The Supreme Court did not again decide a controversy involving
disestablishment until 1973 when Mattz v. Arnett came before the Court. In Mattz,
a unanimous Court held that the Klamath River Indian Reservation continued to exist
within its defined boundaries, despite an 1892 law that opened the reservation to
homesteading. The sparse population of the area also figured prominently in the
Court's decision. Reaffirming the fundamental policy

forward~d

in Seymour, the

#

Court held that "a congressional determination to terminate [a reservation] must be
expressed on the face of the Act," but added, "or be clear from surrounding
circumstances and legislative history. ,,18 Following Mattz, courts began to look
behind the written words of statutes and treaties to determine meaning and purpose
within the context of time period. Repeated unsuccessful attempts by Congress to
terminate a reservation could not persuade the Court that the ultimate legislation that
opened a reservation intended to extinguish or diminish its boundaries. In Mattz,
for example, the 1892 House legislation consistently included termination language
for the Klamath River Reservation. However, in the final version of the statUte the
Senate struck that wording, creating a much more moderate act.
With the criteria of Mattz now in place, the Court faced a new array of cases
as Native American groups tried to gain further answers about the definition of
Indian country. The two most critically important of these cases centered on

IBM

attz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 487 (1973).
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whether a reservation's original boundaries had been diminished simply by the sale
of allotment lands. 19
In the 1975 case of Decoteau v. District County Court, the Supreme Court
found that Congress had intended to disestablish the South Dakota Lake Taverse
Reservation, an area in which the dominant white population held most of the land.
The Court ignored the fact that the tribe had not ceded jurisdiction of governance in
any agreement. Nor did the Court consider that both the legislative and the
executive branches still forwarded political recognition to the tribe eighty years after
;

Congress had supposedly disestablished the reservation. Instead, the Court paid
considerable attention to contemporary non-Indian accounts offered at trial. These
testimonies suggested that Indians living on the reservation anticipated political
dissolution as a consequence of the pact. 20
Two years later, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, the Court heard another
disestablishment case. This one involved the reduction of the South Dakota Rosebud
Sioux Reservation. Around 1900, after creation of the reservation by treaty,
Congress passed a series of acts that opened large sections of the reservation for
homesteading. The main question focused on whether the later statutes resulted in
the disestablishment of the reservation. If so, four South Dakota counties, a~ the
time mostly populated with non-Indians, fell outside Indian country. The Court

19Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice, 76-77.
2°Ibid., 205.
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found that Congress, through passage of the acts, had intended to remove the
counties from the reservation and to reduce its boundaries. 21
The Court based its decision on the "unquestioned actual assumption of state
jurisdiction over the unallotted lands" in the area after the legislation took effect. In
the majority opinion, Justice William Rehnquist stated:
The long standing assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area
that is over 90% non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not
only demonstrates the parties understanding of the meaning of the
Act[s], but has created justifiable expectations which should not be
upset by so strained a reading of the Acts of Congress. 22
;

In Rosebud, the Court essentially approved the incursion of state jurisdiction over
time as a factor in striking down tribal authority.
These three boundary cases, Mattz, Decoteau, and Rosebud, shared many
characteristics that established them as a class, even as they differed in detail. Mattz
involved a sparsely populated area, while Decoteau and Rosebud entailed more
settled regions. The cases demanded a considerable amount of meticulous historical
research. Attorneys gathered and debated any evidence that could illuminate the
intent of Congress. Attorneys inflated minute phrasing and argued over various
shades of meaning teased out of the statutory wording. Coupled with the search for
Indian understandings of land cession agreements and the probable intent of
Congress, the cases demanded that justices also consider the demographics of the
present situation.

21Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, 42.
22Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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The decisions rendered in Mattz, Decoteau, and Rosebud introduced new
categories used by the Supreme Court in deciding jurisdiction disputes. Although
congressional intent still played a role in the decision-making process, the Court
emphasized balancing tribal interests against those of the state. In relying on both
congressional intent and weighted interests, the Court created a dichotomy that
further muddled the philosophical base used in deciding these cases.
This split carried with it a host of problems. Rather than wrestle with
comprehensive principles, the courts retreated to conservative,;case-by-case
reasoning, emphasizing facts over rules, and details over generalities. If a court, in
a particular case, chose to focus on congressional intent, then it faced the
ambiguities of legislative history. This led court members toward arbitrary
conclusions about congressional intent. Since Congress often legislated for
individual tribes, each case rested on a different foundation, and the courts became
intoxicated with detaiL Yet, if a court gave more credence to the balanced interest
doctrine, the outcome could prove just as uncertain. Tribes had no means of
knowing whether a court would place more emphasis on the demographics of the
contested area or the'tenets of tribal sovereignty. 23
Perhaps no contemporary jurisdiction case better illustrates the desultory
character of the courts than that of Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah. The Ute tribe
and the state of Utah disagreed as to the original boundaries of the Uinta-Ouray

23Russel L. Barsh and James Y. Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and
Political Liberty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 138-140.
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Reservation and, therefore, claimed conflicting jurisdictions over non-Indian lands.
Like most modem jurisdiction cases, the Ute case revolved around the meaning of a
series of legislative statutes passed at the tum of the century. The Utes and the State
of Utah contested the intention behind congressional acts of 1894, 1897, 1902, and
1905, which opened Ute lands to white settlement. The effort to reconstruct the
"intent" of Congress nearly a century after it had acted on most of the legislation
concerning the Ute lands provided an arduous task for the courts. Ultimately, three
separate federal courts heard the case with each handing down contrasting opinions
;

derived from different interpretations of the historical record.
Studies that focus on an examination of courts and cases that have furnished
unique doctrines in United States law represent a popular element in legal history.
Although this approach provides critical insights, the study of Indian law reaches
beyond such a narrow treatment. Indian law is the product of vivid and complex
historical relationships between two distinct and sovereign peoples. 24 The historical
forces that have created conflict in Indian/white relationships frequently provoke
contemporary court battles over jurisdiction rights.
The Ute case not only affords an opportunity to understand the special
character of this particular body of law, but it also highlights the nature of cultural
strife and misunderstanding between Indians and whites that forged the impetus for
legal action. When the United States Supreme Court handed down its 1994 decision

24Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: American Indian Sovereignty,
TnbaI Law, and United States Law in the Nineteenth Century (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7.
.
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in the Ute case, it signaled the end of a fourteen-year legal battle that found its
antecedents in a one-hundred-fifty-year history of Indian/white conflict.
Much of Ute history tells of a people constantly struggling to maintain their
traditional land base, and the concomitant rights inherent to jurisdiction over those
lands.2S Ute resistance to recurring and persistent white encroachments inveterated
deep-rooted and long-lasting resentments among the Ute people. As a result, the
Utes have tried continually to gain a greater degree of autonomy. This quest for
sovereignty found its ultimate expression in the autumn of

197~,

when the Utes

claimed jurisdictional control over disputed lands once included within their
reservation boundaries. For the Utes, a federal court ruling represented hope for
the validation and protection of their own sovereignty.
The Utes' declaration of their governmental authority met stout opposition.
Many whites, living as neighbors to the Indians, denounced the Ute assertion.
White residents living in the disputed area misconstrued Ute intentions and felt it
grossly unjust that they faced the possibility of being governed by a tribal council in
which they had no vote. As in the circumstance of the Utes, a long history lay at
the root of white hostility. Whites claimed that at the tum of the century their
ancestors settled on the land in good faith, secured legal title to the land, and
endured the tribulations of homesteading. More importantly, without challenge
from the Utes, these settlers established local governments that had practiced

25Floyd A. O'Neil, "An Anguished Odyssey: The Flight of the Utes
1906-1908," Utah Historical Quarterly 36 (1968): 317.
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jurisdiction over the disputed lands for seven decades. These facts guaranteed
whites, so they argued, a right to government under white authority. The Ute
jurisdiction claim stood as a direct threat to Anglo control and incited white anger.
The enduring Ute bitterness and the opposing white consternation underscore
the intensities that drove the quest for litigation in the Ute case. These powerful
historical forces destroyed any hope of a peaceful, negotiated settlement and
motivated each group to pursue litigation as the sole means of solving this dispute.
When coupled with the fact that a long-standing legislative history surrounded the
;

conflict over the Ute lands, this situation assumed even greater complexity. Only by
examining all of these factors does a clear understanding of the Ute case emerge.

17

CHAPTER II
"OUR LAND IS SMALL"

Around the year 1800, when the first significant contact occurred between
white Europeans and the Ute Indians, the Utes dwelled within a territory that
included large portions of northern New Mexico, western Colorado, and eastern
Utah. Historians estimate that Ute lands consisted of nearly 225 ,000 square miles.
This vast and diversified land varied from arid plains to immenk mountain ranges,
and terraced plateaus to rugged canyons. Virtually the entire area of Ute occupation
was undisputed. 1
Seven distinct bands made up the Ute nation. Three of these shared the
eastern portion of the above mentioned lands: the Uintah, the White River, and the
Uncompahgre Bands. These bands traveled to visit one another, intermarried, aided
each other in times of war, and shared religious, social, and ethical ·beliefs. Because
of the Utes' relationship with the earth, their culture was closely tied to the land.
The land provided many important resources to the Ute people: sources of food,
clothing, and weapons; shelter from climatic conditions; meeting grounds for
councils and ceremonies; and sacred areas designated for the healing of the sick. 2

lFred Conetah, A History of the Northern Ute People, eds. Kathryn L.
MacKay and Floyd A. O'Neil (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Printing
Service, 1982), 1-19.
2Ibid., 33.
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Because the Utes lived north of the Spanish frontier, they had avoided the
control of European invaders for nearly two centuries. But, during the decade of
1810-1820, a great number of activities that impinged on Ute lands began in the
Rocky Mountain region. There began an intense search for furs in the area of
present-day Colorado, a search that initiated many arguments between native groups
of the region, Spanish officials, and United States citizens who trapped the area. By
1825, a large number of people had pushed their way into what became known as
Utah to gather furs. Prom the northwest came Peter Skene Ogden and his men of
the Hudson's Bay Company into the areas at the northern edges of the Ute domain.
Other parties of trappers came from the Southwest and the East. Concurrently,
ledediah Smith crossed Utah and mapped the Old Spanish Trail, which became an
important trade route for woven cloth and cattle between Santa Pe and Los
Angeles. 3
The Utes took part in the vigorous fur trade of the region and thrived. They
exchanged animal pelts for weapons, ammunition, blankets, and trinkets. The fur
trade with the Utes proved so extensive that the United States government
established several trading posts in the Uintah Basin, the heart of Ute lands. 4
The Utes had reached the apex of their prosperity, when the Mexican War
and the arrival of more Anglo-Americans from the East disrupted their lives. The

3Ployd A. O'Neil and Kathryn L. MacKay, A History of the UintahOuray Ute Lands, American West Center Occasional Papers no. 10 (Salt Lake
City: American West Center, 1979), 3-4.
4Conetah, A History of the Northern Ute People, 33.
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war between the United States and Mexico caused a rapid influx of whites into the
American Southwest. Encouraged by the reports o! John C. Fremont, who traveled
through Utah in 1844, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
commonly known as Mormons, began their migration to the area in 1846 and
established themselves on Ute lands before the war concluded. The Utes' reacted
circumspectly to the arrival of the settlers.
Mormon settlements branched out rapidly. Six years after the Mormons first
located in the Salt Lake Valley, they had expanded up and down the west side of the
;

Wasatch Mountains, laying claim to most of the irrigable dells in Utah. 5 Soon,
conflicts developed between Indians and whites for possession of the most fertile
lands.
As the Mormons moved south, taking up new territory, they pushed the Utes
off their homelands. The Utes particularly valued these lands, especially for their
game and fish. The Utes resisted this intrusion and armed conflict broke out
between the Mormons and the natives--first at Battle Creek in 1850 and then the socalled Walker War of 1853-54. Mormon occupation of Ute winter campsites at
Provo, Utah, provoked the outbreak of the Walker War. The Indian leader Wakara
(called Walker by the Mormons) led the Utes in a succession of raids against the
white intruders. The Mormon territorial militia quickly defeated the faroutnumbered Indians. The terms of the peace negotiations ending the war

. sJoseph G. Jorgensen, The Sun Dance Religion: Power for the Powerless
(ChIcagO: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 32.
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humiliated the Utes and secured the Utah Lake region for Mormon settlements. 6
For the next several years hostilities continued as the invading whites either killed,
captured, or removed the natives from their lands.
When a new federal superintendent of Indian affairs, Benjamin Davies,
arrived in Utah in early 1861, the Utes, according to him, existed "in a state ... of
destitution." Davies reported that the Utes had been "reduced ... to the lowest ebb of
destitution, suffering and want ... their poverty, suffering, and distress ... beyond
description." The starving Utes took desperate actions. When Davies inquired
;

about the low number of children present in the Ute camp, the Utes explained that
"since the white people came the buffalo and deers had all gone away, and they had
nothing to feed [the children] with ... [and] they had laid them on the ground to die
and be eaten by the wolves.,,7
That same year, 1861, the Mormons asked the federal government to remove
the Utes to some distant point reserved for them. Davies suggested that the Uintah
Valley could serve such a purpose. At the suggestion, Governor Brigham Young
sent a survey expedition to determine whether the area might prove suitable for

6Floyd A. O'Neil, "The Reluctant Suzerainty: The Uintah and Ouray
Reservation," Utah Historical Quarterly 39 (Spring 1971): 130-31; O'Neil and
MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 5-6.
7Letters Received, Benjamin Davies, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for
Utah, to William P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 20 January 1861.
Utah Superintendency, Records of
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group
75, National Archives. (Special Collections, Merrill Library, Utah State
University, Logan, Micro-film), Utah Reel Num. 83, roll 4 of 10.
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Mormon agrarian settlements. In

thre~"

weeks, the survey party returned and

reported the country "entirely unsuitable for farming purposes, ... one vast contiguity
of waste, and measurably valueless, excepting for nomadic purposes ... and to hold
the world together.,,8 Less than a month later, at the request of the secretary of the
interior, President Abraham Lincoln set aside the "entire valley of the Uintah River
within Utah Territory" as an Indian reservation for the Utes. 9
The federal government initially made little effort to remove the Indians to
the new reservation. Most of the Utes found the Uintah Basin uninhabitable for
;

year-round occupation as had the Mormons, and many continued the struggle to use
their traditional lands increasingly occupied by whites. 10 Similar to the actions taken
by Chief Wakara a decade earlier, Chief Black Hawk and a group of starving Utes
began raiding white settlements throughout the eastern half of Utah and in western
Colorado. The Mormons, unable to stop these depredations, took defensive
measures and promised a war of extermination against the Utes. These actions led
to the eruption of armed conflict. Black Hawk guided the Utes in the struggle. The
war that followed borrowed his name. The Black Hawk War, 1865-1869, stands as
the largest military engagement ever fought on Utah soil. 11

8Conetah, A History of the Northern Ute People, 41.
9Indian Affairs Bureau, Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations
1855-1912 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912), 169.
11lJ(athryn L. MacKay, "The Strawberry Valley Reclamation Project and
the Opening of the Uintah Indian Reservation," Utah Historical Quarterly 50
(1982): 69.
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During the initial stages of the war, a delegation of Mormons and Utes met
at Spanish Fork in June 1865 and signed a peace treaty. Although Ute Chief Soweet
had stated at the negotiations that the Utes" ... did not want to sell their land and go
away; they wanted to live around the graves of their fathers," the Utes nonetheless
agreed to remove to the Uintah Valley Reservation and relinquished their claims to
all other lands within the Utah territory. The treaty also made detailed stipulations
for the staffing and operation of the Uintah Agency. 12 Congress, ill-disposed to
support Mormon interests, refused to ratify the treaty.
When promised money, livestock, farming implements, and other treaty
provisions did not appear at the Uintah Agency, the intensity of the Black Hawk
War increased. Black Hawk again attacked and looted Mormon villages, this time
with a group of a hundred warriors. The war dragged on during 1866, 1867, and
1868 with immense cost to the settlements of central Utah. 13
Conditions only deteriorated for the Utes in 1869. The federal government
and the Mormon Church refused to address Ute complaints. 14 Eventually starvation,
the lack of supplies, and the superior power of the territorial militia spelled defeat

liO'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 6-7.
120'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 7; Coulsen Wright and
Geneva Wright, "Indian-White Relations in the Uintah Basin," Utah Humanities
Review 3 (1948): 324.
130'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 7.
14Jorgensen, Sun Dance Religion, 37.
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Fig. 1. The Ute Indian Reservation, 1865. O'Neil and MacKay, UintahOuray Ute Lands, 18. Reprinted with permission from the American West Center,
Univesity of Utah, Salt Lake City.
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for Black Hawk. In 1869, the remnant of the abject Utes moved from the central
valleys of Utah to the Uintah Reservation.
The first three years on the Uintah Reservation proved difficult for the Utes.
Meager federal assistance reached the tribe. Hunger and disease once again spread
among the Indians. The 1871 appointment of John J. Critchlow as the Indian agent
for the Uintah Agency ameliorated the situation. Critchlow became a tireless
advocate of Indian interests. He repeatedly solicited Congress to organize churches
on the reservation to help Christianize the Indians. He endeavored to create
;

reservation schools and established herding as a major economic pursuit, reasoning
that herding suited the Indian temperament better than agriculture. The removal of
the Colorado Utes into Utah stymied Critchlow's efforts. I5
. A long history of invasion, conflict, and perfidy preceded the removal of the
Colorado Utes into Utah in 1881-1882. The discovery of gold at Pike's Peak in
1859 brought many whites into Colorado . . Whites invaded the area so quickly that
the federal government organized Colorado as a territory in 1861. 16 The succeeding
year, Congress ratified a treaty that established an agency at Hot Sulfur Springs in
western Colorado for the Northern Colorado Utes.
In 1865, miners discovered gold, silver, and coal in western Colorado and
again whites swarmed onto Ute lands. Whites pressured Congress to negotiate a

150'Neil an4 MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 8.
1634,000 people populated Colorado in 1860. By 1880, the number had
grown to over 194,000. Jorgensen, Sun Dance Religion, 43.
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new treaty with the Utes, in which the Indians gave up more land. The 2 March
1868 Treaty gave the Colorado Utes roughly 1,500,000 acres of land in western
Colorado. The federal government created two new agencies--the Uncompahgre,
located at Los Pinos, hosted the Taviwach Utes, later known as the Uncompahgre.
The Northern Colorado Utes moved to the other agency at White River and assumed
that name as their own. Non-Ute settlers continued to encroach on Ute lands over
the next ten years and acrimony between the Utes and whites proliferated. The
battle-cry, "The Utes Must Go!" echoed across the state.
In 1878, the federal government appointed an imperious reformer named
Nathan Meeker as the new agent at White River. Meeker, a former newspaper
correspondent with utopian ideals, wished to convert the Indians from "heathens"
into yeoman farmers. Meeker's technique called for the stringent application of
Christian discipline and the threat of military force to end Ute gambling and
begging. In September 1879, the White River Utes rose in rebellion and killed
Meeker and some of his staff. The U.S. Army intervened, but the White River Utes
destroyed the first detachment of government troops. To prevent a hopeless
encounter with the reinforced army, the leader of the Uncompahgres, Ouray,
intervened and ended the uprising. 17

17For a thorough account of the events leading up to and proceeding the
Meeker Massacre see: Robet:t Emmitt, The Last War Trail: The Utes and the
Settlement of Colorado (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954).
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The Meeker Massacre finally gave the Colorado citizenry the leverage
needed to guarantee the removal of the Utes from Colorado. 18 In the view of
Colorado governor, Frederick Pitkin, the federal government should either remove
the Utes or "they must necessarily be exterminated .... [and] the state would be
willing to settle the Indian trouble at its own expense. The advantage of throwing
open 12,000,000 acres of land to miners and settlers would more than compensate
all the expenses incurred. ,,19 In Washington, D. C., the secretary of the interior and
a delegation of Ute leaders reached an agreement. The White River Utes agreed to
~

give up their lands in Colorado and settle upon the Uintah Valley Reservation in
Utah. The agreement also called for the removal of the Uncompahgre Utes, who
were innocent of any violence against the whites in Colorado. 2O Whereas the
government originally intended to resettle the Uncompahgre Utes near the present
location of Grand Junction, Colorado, a federal commission selected a rectangular
strip of land adjacent to the Uintah Valley Reservation in Utah. By Executive Order
of 5 January 1882, President Chester Arthur dictated that "the tract ... of country, in
the Territory of Utah, be ... set apart as a reservation for the Uncompahgre Utes. ,,21

180'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, · 12.
19Governor Frederick Pitkin as quoted in Jorgensen, Sun Dance Religion, 46.
2°An Act to Accept and Ratify the Agreement Submitted by the
Confederated Bands of Ute Indians in Colorado, for the Sale of Their
Reservation in Said State, and for Other Purposes, and to Make the Necessary
Appropriations for Carrying Out the Same, Statutes at Large, 21, chap_ 223,
200 (1880).
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Almost immediately, Congress sought to decrease the size of the
Uncompahgre Reservation. As in Colorado, the discovery of minerals in Utah
resulted in the loss of more land. Coinciding with the Colorado Utes arrival in
Utah, government officials had discovered gilsonite (a hydrocarbon mineral) on both
the Uintah Valley and the Uncompahgre reservations. In January 1886, miners filed
the first gilsonite claims on the Uintah Valley Reservation. 22 Mining companies
applied immense pressure on Congress to hand the land over to mining interests--an
effort which gained ultimate success.

;

The Utes protested the trespass of miners on their land, but agent T. A.
Byrnes saw no reason not to remove the miners' claims from the reservation stating
that "such lands are not ... used or occupied by the Indians ... for the reason that they
are not fit for agricultural or grazing purposes. "23 On 24 May 1888, Congress acted
and removed a strip of roughly 7,000 acres from the Uintah Valley Reservation for
mining purposes.
Later in 1888, miners discovered a gilsonite vein, the Cowboy, on the
Uncompahgre Reservation. With the removal of the acreage from the Uintah Valley

21Indian Affairs Bureau, Executive Orders Relating to Indian
Reservations, 170-71.
220'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 15.
23Letters Received, T. A. Byrnes, U.S. Indian Agent, to Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, 18 February 1888, Uintah and Ouray Agency, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, National Archives. Photocopy of
original in possession of Floyd O'Neil, American West Center, University of
Utah, Salt Lake City. (Hereafter Fa-AWe).
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Reservation acting as precedent, Congress moved swiftly to restore to the public
domain a twelve-mile strip of land containing the Cowboy. Despite Congressional
passage of the bill, President Benjamin Harrison vetoed the legislation. He
explained:
I do not think it wise, without notice even to the Indians, to
segregate these lands from their reservation ... to take these lands in
this manner is calculated to excite their distrust and fears and ... to
create serious trouble. 24
Washington officials remained determined in their efforts to gain access to
the mineral deposits. During the years 1890-1894, seven bills i to change the
boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reservation" were introduced to Congress. In
1893, the United States assistant attorney general indicated to the secretary of the
interior that earlier legislation reserved the Uncompahgre lands for the purpose of
making allotments and the federal government could therefore open the reservation
for sale. 25 Congress responded in 1894 by passing the Indian Appropriations Act.
The act provided for an appointed commission to make allotments to the Utes and to
restore the surplus lands "to the public domain. ,,26

24James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents, 1789-1897, vol. 9 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1900), 88.
25Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1101 (D. Utah
1981).
26An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department and Fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with Various Indian
Tribes for the Fiscal Year Ending June Thirtieth, Eighteen Hundred and NinetyFive, and for Other Purposes, Statutes at Large, 28, chap. 290, 286 (1894).
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It soon became obvious that the Ute commission faced many problems,
including stout Indian opposition to the act and a dearth of sufficient agricultural
lands to comply with the intended allotment program. In fact, agent George Gordon
described the land as, "extremely rugged and fearfully riven, ... a wild and ragged
desolation, valuable for nothing ... there are no agriculturallands ... that would ... be
advisable now or hereafter to attempt to practically utilize for agricultural
purposes. ,,27 Meanwhile, pressure by white settlers increased on the reservation
boundaries and trespassing surfaced as a major problem. After

~mplaint

,

by agent

James Randlett, the commissioner of Indian affairs recommended the federal
prosecution of trespassers and requested "a sufficient military force" from the War
Department to support the Indian agent on the Uncompahgre Reservation. 28
By 1897, the committee had made little progress in allotment and Congress
again acted. After extensive debate, Congress enacted provisions within the 1897
Indian Appropriations Act that mandated the allotment of the Uncompahgre
Reservation and opened all nonallotted lands to white settlement on 1 April 1898. 29

27U .S. Congress, House, Changing the Boundary for the Uncompahgre
Reservation: Report from the Committee on Indian Affairs, H.R. 3305, 51st.
Cong., 2d. Sess., 2 February 1890, Serial 2885, p. 4.
28Letters Received, James Randlett, U.S. Indian Agent, to Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, 19 January 1897, FO-AWC.; Letters Received, Thomas
Smith, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Secretary of Interior, 30
January 1897, FO-AWC.
29An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department and Fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with Various Indian
Tribes for the Fiscal Year Ending June Thirtieth, Eighteen Hundred and NinetyEight, and for Other Purposes, Statutes at Large, 30, chap. 3, 87 (1897).
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Troubled by these events, the Uncompahgre sent a delegation to Washington, D. C.,
where it acquiesced. The group agreed to accept allotments on the Uintah Valley
Reservation, if the commission could not find adequate lands on the Uncompahgre
Reservation.
Poor weather and deep snow greatly fettered the allotment process for
months and necessitated the commission's request for more time. While the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) found initial success in pushing a delay through Congress,
the request ultimately foundered. The bureau informed the Uncompahgre
;

commission by telegram and the "opening" of the reservation went ahead on 1 April
1898 as planned. The commission had failed to make a single allotment prior to the
opening. Through separate legislation, Congress eventually .confirmed eighty-three
allotments made within the Uncompahgre Reservation by 1899. 30
Concurrent with the drive to open the Uncompahgre Reservation came an
attempt to negotiate a treaty with the Uintah and White River bands for the
allotment of their reservation and the opening of surplus lands. Illegal mining
operations had taken place on the Uintah Reservation for many years causing mining
companies to lobby for the opening of the reservation. In addition to the difficulties
caused by mining interests, the Utes felt pressure on their western border as

30An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
th~ Indian Department and Fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with Various Indian
TrIbes for the Fiscal Year Ending June Thirtieth, Nineteen Hundred, and for
Qther Purposes, Statutes at Large, 30, chap. 324, 940-41 (1899).
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cattlemen from Heber and Provo grazed their livestock in the western valleys of the
Uintah Basin. 31
The Utes held a council in March 1887 to protest the trespass and to demand
that the cattlemen pay a tax for grazing privileges. Only one cattleman agreed to
pay the levy while others continued to encroach on Ute land. In September 1890,
the White River and Uintah Utes held another council, once again to complain about
the stock trespassing. They decided to order all the illegal cattlemen and their stock
off the reservation and wished to disallow future use of their land. ; The stock
owners protested and the Uintah agent complained, "the task of keeping the
reservation clear of sheep and cattle is one of very great difficulty. ,,32 BIA officials
favored relinquishing some tribal property because the Ute population had dwindled
and the Indians did not steadfastly farm the land. Forcing the Utes to surrender the
land would solve the trespass problem. 33
Farmers also wanted the Utes' demesne. Starting in 1879, farmers began
diverting water from the Strawberry Valley and its several streams, located on the
western half of the reservation. Due to the aridity of eastern Utah, many farmers
depended on the unlawfully obtained water to irrigate their crops. Farmers in
Heber Valley unlawfully diverted water from the Strawberry River and built canals

310'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 21-22.
32Letters Received, Robert Waugh, U.S. Indian Agent, to T.J. Morgan,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 25 August 1891, FO-AWe.
33 Jorgensen, Sun Dance Religion, 51.
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that carried ·the water from the Uintah Basin to lands in Wasatch County. White
settlers built these irrigation systems on Indian land without the consent of the Utes
or the authorization of the BIA.34
A bill was introduced in Congress in 1892 that would have granted the right
to divert water from the Uintah Valley Reservation. The bill did not pass, but
whites continued to illegally divert water. Local whites waited for federal
legislation to remove lands from the Ute reservation to confirm their right to use the
water. 35
By 1887, when Congress passed the Dawes Severalty Act, the newspapers of
Utah were calling for the allotment in severalty of the Uintah Reservation and the
opening of the rest of the Ute lands to white settlement. Pressure mounted to
appoint a commission to allot lands on the Uintah Reservation. Actually, the
Uncompahgre allotment commission already held the authorization to negotiate an
agreement with the Uintah and White River Utes, via the provisions of the 1894
Indian Appropriations Act. But, the commission had spent its time trying to induce
the Uncompahgres to take allotments and had not yet met with the Uintah
Reservation Utes.

Instead, Uintah Indian Agent William Beck met in council with

the Utes to try to elicit their support for allotments. 36 Negotiations with the Utes
proved a complete failure as the Indians assiduously opposed all proposals.

34McKay, "The Strawberry Valley Reclamation," 72.
350'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 24.
36Ibid., 25.
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MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 28. Reprinted with permission from the
American West Center, Univesity of Utah, Salt Lake City.
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Matters worsened for the Utes. Throughout their tenureQO the reservation,
the Utes heard continual talk about the opening of their reservation. By the late
1890s, action supplanted words as local, state, and federal officials initiated the
opening process. 37
In June 1898, Congress passed an act that stipulated the allotment of the
Uintah Reservation after the obtainment of Ute consent. The Utes remonstrated. In
November 1898, a White River and Uintah delegation traveled to Washington,
D. C., to express its objections to the proposed legislation. Speaking for the group,
;

the Ute Indian Sasanockit stated, "Our land is small and we do not want to sell it to
anyone ... We have no more land that we want ourselves for our own use. ,,38 Again
discussions with the Uintah and White River Utes collapsed. The White River band
particularly repudiated the allotment idea. Commissioner Ross Guffin reported,
"The Indians were unanimous and determined in their opposition to making cession
to the government of any of their lands. ,,39
Over the next two years Utah's congressional delegation worked feverishly
to open the reservation. In 1902, Congress held hearings to consider the matter. At
those hearings, Representative George Sutherland (Utah-R) vehemently argued that
the Indians did not rightfully own the reservation; therefore, negotiations and

370'Neil, "The Reluctant Suzerainty," 137.
38Letters Received, Sasanockit, et al., statement, to W. A. Jones,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 26 November 1898, FO-AWe.
39Letters Received, Ross Guffin, Uintah Commission, to Commjssioner of
Indian Affairs, 7 January 1899, FO-AWC.
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consent were not required to take the land. Sutherland contended that since the
creation of the Uintah Reservation came from the executive and legislative branches,
those two agencies had "the power to restore ... [this] reservation to the public
domain" without the sanction of the Indians. 40
Congress continued to pursue disestablishment of the Ute reservation. The
1902 Indian Appropriations Act called for the allotment of the Uintah Reservation
"with the consent. .. of the Ute Indians." According to the act all surplus lands left
over after allotment returned to the "public domain. ,,41 Congress did not share
#

Representative Sutherland's view that it should unilaterally open the reservation;
Indian consent conditioned all clauses of the statute. The 1902 act also gave special
privileges to the Raven Mining Company. This and other mining companies proved
the most influential interests in securing this first piece of allotment legislation.
President Theodore Roosevelt signed the bill into law on 28 May 1902, but
did so with serious objections. Roosevelt especially disapproved of the favored
treatment the act afforded mining lessees. He signed the bill only after influential
congressmen promised to amend the bill, removing the unacceptable passages. 42

40U .S. Congress, Senate, Leasing of Indian Lands: Hearing before the
Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Doc. 212, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 February
1902, Serial 4234, p. 113.
41 An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department and Fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with Various Indian
Tribes for the Fiscal Year Ending June Thirtieth, Nineteen Hundred and Three, ·
and for Other Purposes, Statutes at Large, 32, chap. 888, 263-64 (1902).
42Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1115, 1116 (D.
Utah 1981).
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The commissioner of Indian affairs instructed U. S"·Indian Inspector James
McLaughlin to meet in council with the Ute bands "with a view to obtaining their
consent to the allotment of their lands. »43 But, before Mclaughlin began
negotiations an important event took place. On 5 January 1903, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, which held that Congress could
allot and open Indian reservations without tribal consent. 44
Apparently motivated by the Lone Wolf decision, Congress felt more assured
to use arbitrary means to secure land from the Uintah Reservation Utes. In the
;

spring of 1903, Congress passed another Indian Appropriations Act that allocated
funds to carry out the provisions of the 1902 act. The 1903 act further provided
that if the BIA could not obtain Ute consent by 1 June 1903 then the secretary of the
interior would allot the land without Indian approval.
Inspector Mclaughlin found himself in the awkward position of the person
delegated to negotiate Indian consent to a chain of events that would occur
regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. On 18 May 1903 Mclaughlin called

43Letters Received, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to James
McLaughlin, U.S. Indian Inspector, 29 April 1903, FO-AWC.
44In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court recognized a seemingly unlimited
federal power to alter tribal property and jurisdictional powers set forth in
treaties between the federal government and various Native American groups.
After the decision, Congress relied on Lone Wolf to open several reservations
for white settlement and speed the pace of federal assimilation policy. For
further discussion see: Blue Clark, Lone·Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaty Rights and
!!!dian Law at the End of the Nineteenth Century (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1994); Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, 2425; Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 154-56;
Prucha, The Great Father, 295-96.
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the Utes to a council that lasted six days. There he explained the plans to open the
reservation to white settlers:
I am here to obtain the consent of you people to accept allotments as
specified by the law ... My friends, if I had my choice in this matter I
would be glad to see you occupy all of this country but this is
impossible. The White people are coming into the country and no
power can keep them out. 45
McLaughlin did not intimidate the Utes. As the council wore on, Indian opposition
to allotment manifested. Succioff, a Ute leader, explained:
This land is ours ... We are not going to give up any of this reservation
away .. .It is ours and were are going to keep it. We know our ;
reservation line, and the White Man knows it. 46
White River Ute Tim Johnson continued:
We haven't got a whole lot of things to talk about ... This land is ours
and we haven't got it for sale .. .I was born on this land and we do not
want to give it Up.47
In exasperation, McLaughlin argued to the Utes that they had no choice but to
agree, stating:
Now my friends, the statements of your speakers have convinced me
that you do not understand what I have said ... My friends, you want to
get rid of this idea that you have the say whether your reservation can
be opened or not. You are simply to say whether or not you will
accept allotments ... This is the condition, my friends, and it is your
duty to accept it gracefully because the law of the great council has
said SO.48
45Minutes of Council, held by James McLauglin, U.S. Indian Inspector,
with the Uintah and White River Ute Indians, 18-23 May 1903, p. 12. FOAWC.
46Ibid., 14.
47Ibid., 15.
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Of the 280 male Indians belonging to the White River and Uintah bands,
McLaughlin succeeded in getting only eighty-two signatures supporting allotments.
McLaughlin noted that "the attitude of the Indians ... [was] ... unanimously opposed to
the opening of their reservation. ,,49 Despite this failure, shortly after talks with the
Utes ended, the secretary of the interior authorized the mandatory allotment of lands
to the Utes.
The Uintah Indian agent struggled in making allotments to the Utes. In
;

December 1904, Agent C. G. Hall reported on the difficulties he faced. Poor
weather and surveying problems, including the selection of an Indian grazing
reserve, proved particularly baneful to the allotment process. The commissioner of
Indian affairs had to request the aid of federal troops to patrol the Uintah
Reservation and expel "sooners" anxious to settle on the lands. The Utes also
continued in their opposition.
Meanwhile, Congress continually inquired of the secretary of the interior
about the progress made towards opening. The secretary submitted a report
indicating that the ag~nt at Uintah needed more time to complete allotment. Once
again using an Indian Appropriations Act as a vehicle for action on Ute lands, the
House passed an amendment to the 1905 act providing for more time and set the
opening for 1 September 1905. The amendment called for the restoration of Ute

48Ibid., 34.
49U .S. Congress, House, Grant for Lands for Use of Certain Indians, H.
Doc. 33, 58th Cong., 1st. Sess., 30 May 1903, Serial 4565, p. 5.
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lands to the "public domain" by presidential proclamatIon. The Senate rejected the
House amendment and instead passed a bill opening the surplus lands of the Uintah
Reservation for settlement under provisions of the "homestead and town-site laws of
the United States." This change of language from the House amendment
emphasized opening the reservation under specific rules and regulations. so The
Indian Appropriations Act of 1905 contained another important action on the part of
Congress; it allowed President Theodore Roosevelt to set aside land from the Uintah
Valley Reservation as part of a federal forest reserve.
In April 1905, a commission began the work of allotting lands on the Uintah
Reservation. In a period of just two months the commission allotted 103,265 acres
of land. While the press reported that the Utes appeared satisfied with the opening
of the reservation, the Utes made one last desperate plea to reverse the allotment
process. A Ute delegation traveled to Washington, D. C., to communicate their
strong opposition to the forthcoming event. The delegation found no success. 51
A presidential proclamation of 14 July 1905 set the date for entry on the
unreserved and unallotted lands of the Uintah Reservation for 28 August 1905. 52
Another presidential proclamation of the same day withdrew over 1,010,000 acres
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of land from the reservation as an addition to the Uintah Forest Reserve. S3 Other
proclamations opened 1,004,285 acres to homestead entry, set aside 2,140 acres in
mining claims, and earmarked 60,160 acres as reservoir sites to conserve water for
the Indians or for use in "general agricultural development.,,54 In total, the
proclamations removed over half of the Ute reservation's two million acres.
The announcement of the opening triggered a land rush. Stories circulated of
fabulous wealth in minerals and natural resources available on the reservation. The
Deseret News reported on "the many thousands of acres of fine lat}d"
obtainable for
t
settlement. 55
The government had too many applicants for the choice lands. Due to the
paucity of suitable agricultural soil, numerous individuals took up marginal and submarginal farms. Almost immediately, most of the new settlers faced serious
trouble. Ironically, the new land the whites were so eager to take away from the
Indians proved as barren as what the Mormons had first evaluated in 1861. By
1912, scores of the settlers were poverty stricken, provoking Utah Senator Reed

s3President Grover Cleveland created the Uintah National Forest by
presidential proclamation in 1897. The reserve included lands of the Uintah
Mountains bordering on the south of the Uintah Indian Reservation. See: U.S.
President, Proclamation, Federal Register (22 February 1897) vol. 29, no. 20,
p.895.
54U.S. President, Proclamation, Federal Register (14 July 1905) vol. 34,
pt. 3, p. 3116-19; U.S. President, Proclamation, Federal Register (14 August
1905) vol. 34, pt. 3, p. 3120-22; U.S. President, Proclamation, Federal
Register (14 August 1905) vol. 34, pt. 3, p. 3143-44.
S5"Filings on 630 Homesteads," Salt Lake City Deseret Semi-Weekly
News, 14 September 1905, p. 3.
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Smoot (R) to ask Congress to place a moratorium,on land payments. Subsequently,
many farmers abandoned their plots. 56
The openIng of the Uintah Reservation instigated one last revolt by the Utes.
Angered by the failed attempt to keep whites off their land, the Utes requested a
move to a new territory of their own. Federal officials refused. Feeling captive on
their own land, a group of Utes decided to flee.
Several hundred Sioux had visited the Uintah Reservation during the 1880s
and had made friendly overfures. The Utes, apparently rememberjng their
~

experience with the Sioux, felt that an alliance with the Plains Indians might bring
force against the federal government. 57 In 1906, under the leadership of Red Cap,
nearly 400 Utes assembled their horses and wagons and set out for South Dakota.
White settlers' anxieties erupted and state officials panicked. The Vernal Express
reported that "Indian trouble of gigantic proportions is brewing. ,,58
Legal considerations made it impossible to restrain the Utes with armed
force. The Indian agent at Fort Duchesne followed the Utes as they fled into
Wyoming. The people of Wyoming called for federal intervention. In desperation,
the commissioner of Indian affairs sent James Mclaughlin, who had previously
negotiated the opening of the Uintah Reservation, to meet with the renegade Utes.

56U.S. Congress, Senate, Time for Homestead Payments on the Uintah
Indian Reservation, Utah, S.R. 893, 62d. Cong., 2d. Sess., 15 June 1912,
Serial 6122, p. 1-2; O'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 32.
570'Neil, "The Reluctant Suzerainty," 141.
58VernaI (Utah) Express, 26 May 1906, p. 1.
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McLaughlin convinced forty-five of the Utes to return to Utah, but the rest of the
group persisted in its drive toward South Dakota. Eventually, the governor of
Wyoming succeeded in achieving federal military support. When U. S. Army
troops surrounded the Utes, the Indians realized the hopelessness of their situation
and accepted escort to Fort Meade, South Dakota. 59
There the proposed alliance with the Sioux proved a sophistry. Not only
were the Sioux unwilling to enter into an alliance, but they wished that the Ute
people would leave. The great campaigns against the U. S. Army )tad ended and the
Sioux nation faced tough times. Also, the Sioux possessed no hunting grounds that
they wished to share with the Utes. In 1908, after two years of bewilderment and
dislocation, the peripatetic Utes returned to Utah. 60
The effect of federal allotment policy proved disastrous for the Utes. The
Indians disliked farming and considered it an undignified pursuit. Moreover, the
lands they held contained poor soil and could not support their agricultural
endeavors. Consequently, the Indians became more dependent on government
support. By 1912, the Utes faced a confined reservation situation that left them
feeling hemmed in. All of this bred Ute umbrage and bitterness. 61

59

0' Neil, "An Anguished Odyssey," 317-23.

6OIbid., 323-26 .
.

61

Conetah, A History of the Northern Ute People, 128.
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The issue of water

ri$h~s

particularly caused Ute resentment. The

presidential proclamations of 1905 had reserved land in the Strawberry Valley as a
reservoir site for the Utes. The Utes soon lost the land.
In 1903, the federal government had granted the U. S. Reclamation Service
the right to send engineering parties on to the Uintah Reservation to explore the
possibilities of the Strawberry Valley Reclamation Project. On 15 December 1905,
the secretary of interior authorized the project and construction began in March of
the next year. One complication existed. The Utes were entitled to benefits from
;

the land. In 1907, a legal question arose concerning the Reclamation Service's
liability to pay rent for use of the Strawberry Valley lands.
In 1910, Utah Senator George Sutherland introduced a bill to Congress that
extinguished the Utes' title to the Strawberry Valley land with the payment of $1.25
per acre. The bill did not pass, but the Indian Appropriations Act for 1911 contained
an amendment that embodied the Sutherland bill. The federal government paid the
Utes $1.25 per acre for 56,859 acres, totaling $71,085. The BIA held the money in
trust for the "benefit" of the Utes. 62 Neither Congress nor the department of the
interior consulted the Utes in any of the actions taken to remove the land from their
control. 63 Whites took over the Strawberry Valley.

62U .S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations for Indian Department, S.R. 357,
61st. Cong., 2d. Sess., 4 April 1910, Serial 5583, p. 445.
63McKay, "The Strawberry Valley Reclamation Project," 87-88.
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In 1914, the federal government appointed Albert Kneale Indian agent for
the Uintah-Ouray Reservation and asked him to save the "prior water rights" of the
Indians. Non-Indian settlers continued to pressure for the use of additional water
located on the reservation, arguing that the Utes did not use the resource. Kneale
outlined a plan to cultivate ninety-five thousand acres of reservation land to utilize
the water. The Utes resisted the plan. 64
Kneale took an alternative course. He started an advertising campaign to
encourage whites to either lease or buy Ute land. Due to the camp&ign's success,
~

Kneale had more applicants than he hoped for. Kneale thus sold over thirty
thousand acres. Hundreds of more white settlers entered the basin clamoring for
Ute water.
Private companies irrigated many acres in the Uintah Basin. These private
operations drew water from the heads of rivers and streams in the Strawberry
Valley and built dams to control flow. As a result, the water table of the lands
south of the Uintah Mountains dropped dramatically, damaging Ute grazing areas.
Water flowed onto Ute allotments and ruined crops.
Three decades of federal allotment policies produced deleterious effects for
the Utes. Allotment destroyed traditional lifestyles and undermined political band
organization. Disease and hunger ravaged the Indians. The Ute population fell
drastically from 1,660 full bloods in 1900 to only 917 in 1930. 65

64Conetah, A History of the Northern Ute People, 129.
6SIbid., 129.
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The 1930s brought a significant change in United states., Indian policy. The
Meriam Report, issued in 1928, described the poor conditions on Indian reservations
and called for numerous reforms. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA), which ushered in the era of the Indian New Deal. The
IRA's great goal aimed at reversing federal allotment policy. The act prohibited the
further allotment of Indian lands, allowed the transfer of individual allotments to
tribal ownership, authorized the secretary of the interior to acquire additional lands
for reservations, and granted any Indian tribe the right to adopt a constitution and
;

organize a tribal government. 66 Under the IRA, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
encouraged the Utes to use tribal funds to purchase land.
Prior to the enactment of the IRA, a controversy arose over the use of
grazing areas on the Uncompahgre Reservation. When Congress originally opened
the land to entry in 1898, white settlers did not claim much of the ground. Many
Uncompahgre remained on the land and continued to live there, confused by the
influx of whites inside the reservation boundaries. Some Utes moved to their
allotments, while others tried to survive the best they could. Most of the

66For further discussion about the Indian New Deal and the Indian
Reorganization Act see: Kenneth R. Philp, John Collier's Crusade for Indian
Reform, 1920-1954 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977); Kenneth R.
Philp, ed., Indian Self-Rule: First-Hand Accounts of Indian-White Relations
from Roosevelt to Reagan (Salt Lake City: Howe Brothers, 1986), 30-109
passim, 265-77; Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford Lytle, The Nations Within: The
Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books,
1984); Prucha, The Great Father, 321-33.
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Uncompahgre still

considere~ ~he

reservation theirs. Indians continued to graze

their livestock on the land. 67
This did not present a problem until the 1920s. Then ranchers from
Colorado and western Utah began driving their cattle onto the Uncompahgre range
for winter grazing. Competition between white and Ute stockmen increased as the
problem became more acute. Federal officials suggested removing the land as a
permanent reserve for the Indians, but the proposal found little support. In 1933,
the Department of the Interior took action and created a grazing reserve from the
;

open land of the Uncompahgre Reservation--about 2.5 million acres. This did not
resolve the problem, as whites and Utes continued to struggle for control.
Two years later, local stockmen, landowners, and government officials
proposed a permanent Ute reserve from the surplus Uncompahgre land. The plan
called for a reserve comprising roughly one-third of the Uncompahgre Reservation,
leaving the rest of the open land for the use of white cattlemen. The bill
encompassing this scheme failed in Congress. 68
In 1937, following the precepts of the IRA, the Indian service pushed ahead
and purchased nearly' 31,000 acres of privately owned land within the Uncompahgre
Reservation. This left only tribal land and public domain remaining within the
boundaries of the reservation. By 1942, Congress still had not acted to create an

67Conetah, A History of the Northern Ute People, 140-41; O'Neil and
MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 35-36.
680'Neil and MacKay, Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands, 35-37.
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Indian reserve. Indians and whites sought litigation to settle the dispute. Finally,
six years later, Congress passed legislation establishing the Indian reserve. The law
extended the boundaries of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation to include the
Uncompahgre land originally designated in the 1935 plan. The annex was known as
the Hill Creek Extension. 69
The boundary of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation remained in tact after 1948.
Over a sixty-six-year period, from 1882-1948, the Utes lost ownership of
approximately 70% of their original reservation lands. In one twelve-year period,
;

1894-1905, Congress opened over 2.9 million acres of Ute land to white settlement.
From over four million acres in 1882, the Utes now controlled only 1.3 million
acres. In 1912, James McLaughlin poignantly described the effects of the loss of
their land on the Utes:
They feel that against their wishes one million acres of land was taken
from them and opened to settlement, and that another million was
placed in a forest reserve .... They know that every dollar received
from the sale of the ceded lands has been expended to conserve the
water of the former reservation, which in all probability will be
appropriated by their white neighbors .... It is difficult to believe that
the rights of these Indians have been sacrificed to meet the demands of
local interests, but it is more difficult, after following step by step the
administration of their affairs, to reach any other conclusion. 70
In 1906, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis Leupp generalized about
the results of Indian allotment policy and looked upon the Ute case as a fiasco. He
said that two ways existed to allot Indian lands--sanely and foolishly. "The Uintah
69Ibid., 36-37.
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Reservation in Utah furnishes an example of the rushing and haphazard method. "
Perhaps more importantly, Leupp offered a nascent observation. He predicted that
"trouble" would come from the way in which the government had allotted Ute
land.71 Sixty-nine years later, the prescient accuracy of Leupp's prognostication
would ring true. In 1975, a new legal controversy emerged between the Ute Indian
tribe and the people of the Uintah Basin.

70U .S. Congress, House, Conditions on Uintah Indian Reservation, Utah, H.
Doc. 892, 62d. Cong., 2d. Sess., 27 July 1912, Serial 6323, p. 3; McKay, "The
Strawberry Valley Reclamation," 87-88.
7lJorgensen, Sun Dance Religion, 55.
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CHAPTER III
"WE WILL NO LONGER STAND IDLY BY"

In October 1975, the Ute Indian tribe filed a complaint with the United
States District Court of Utah. The Utes sought a declaratory judgment to prevent
the state of Utah from interfering with the enforcement of the Indian's right to selfgovernment. For many years prior to this action, members of the Ute tribe made
;

continuous efforts to improve the effectiveness of their tribal institutions and to gain
a greater degree of autonomy over their lives. The promulgation of tribal law
burgeoned as a natural outgrowth of this quest for autonomy.
Since 1937, the Utes had operated a tribal government and Indian court
under the purview of a tribal constitution. 1 The Ute constitution claimed jurisdiction
over the old boundaries of the reservation and granted specific powers to the Ute

lCongressional passage of the Indian Reorganization Act on 18 June 1934
affirmed the rights of Indian people to local self-government. By 1934, traditional
tribal governments had almost ceased to exist on over half of all reservations. BIA
Commissioner John Collier tried to reverse this process by using the IRA to return
tribal affairs to Indian control. The first section of the IRA gave tribes the authority
to regulate law and order, tribal membership, taxation, and other matters relating to
reservation life. It provided for a tribal council system of government and for the
organization of the tribes as business corporations to manage the development of
tribal resources. In 1937, the Utes formalized the Uintah and Ouray Ute Tribal
Business Committee under the edicts of the IRA. This elected committee handled the
political and economic affairs of the Ute people. For more discussion see: Conetah,
A History of the Northern Ute People, 136; Deloria and Lytle, The Nations
Within, 122-153; Prucha, The Great Father, 311, 321; Sharon O'Brien,
American Indian Tribal Governments (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1989), 82-83, 93-94.
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Tribal Business Committee, including the power to levy taxes and maintain law and
order. For several years, it seemed to the Utes' non-Indian neighbors that these
powers, as well as others, lay dormant as far as non-Indian affairs were concerned.
Many whites dismissed the concept of Indian governmental control over their lives
as irrelevant and inconsequential. However, over those same years, the Utes did not
remain passive. 2
The Utes, with the support and encouragement of the United States
government, strove to improve the sophistication and effectiveness Qf their tribal
~

institutions. As their operations expanded, the Utes attempted to recodify and
expand their tribal ordinances, resulting in the enactment of the Law and Order
Code of the Ute Indian Tribe, which became effective on 15 -September 1975. The
preamble summarized the objective behind the code: "This Law and Order
Code ... is established for the purposes of strengthening Tribal self-government.,,3
More explicitly, the code claimed that the Utes' tribal jurisdiction "shall extend to
the territory within the original confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as set
forth by Executive Orders of October 3, 1861 and January 5, 1882, and by the Acts
of Congress approved ... March 11, 1948."4

2Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (D. Utah
1981).
3Ute Indian Tribe, Uintah-Ouray Tribal Business Committee, The Law and
Order Code of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation Utah (Fort
Duchesne, Utah, Sept. 1975), preamble. This document can be found in Ute Indian
Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981) under docket number
C75-408, exhibit number 1-20.
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The code, implemented by the

163~-member-Ute

tribe, asserted civil and

criminal jurisdiction over twenty thousand whites living within the original
boundaries of the reservation. Among its powers, sections of the code allowed Utes
to sue non-Indians on the Uintah-Ouray Reservation, gave the Ute fish and game
department the right to arrest non-Indians for suspected hunting violations,
permitted the Tribal Business Committee to tax and license businesses within the
boundaries of the reservation, and authorized tribal court jurisdiction in criminal
cases where an Indian stood as victim or accused. Far from attempting a
;

comprehensive appropriation of governmental authority in the Uintah Basin, the
Utes placed restrictions on their own authority. The Law and Order Code contained
subject-matter jurisdictions limitations, disallowing tribal dominion over any civil or
criminal matter that did not involve either the tribe, its officers, or a member of the
tribe. 6
Although newspapers in the Uintah Basin reported the possible legal
ramifications of the newly created Law and Order Code in August 1975, white
residents in the region took little notice. But when the Tribal Business Committee
tested its unexercised authority and proposed the licensing of stores and bars that
4Ibid., §1-2-1.
5Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the competency of a court to hear and
determine a particular category of cases. Steven H. Gifis, Dictionary of Legal
Terms: A Simplified Guide to the Language of Law (New York: Baron's
Educational Series, 1983), 243-44.
6Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (D. Utah
1981).
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Reservation
Land
Utes' Claim

Fig. 3. The Uintah-Ouray Reservation, 1975. The map shows the area that
the Ute Law and Order Code claimed jurisdiction over in September 1975. Adapted
from Salt Lake City Tribune, 24 February 1994, sec. A, p. 1.
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sold alcoholic beverages wifu.in the original boundaries of the reservation, a
controversy erupted. 7 Many white businessmen in local towns reacted with outrage
to the idea, calling it a power play by the Utes to usurp city authority. Some people
made threats. The remark of local bar owner Lou Arnold indicated the magnitude
of area opposition to the proposal: "I don't care if the license ends up costing a
quarter, I won't pay it. "8
Enforcement of the Ute law, under the code brought immediate protest from
the Utah municipalities of Duchesne and Roosevelt and from Duchesne County, all
;

of which lay within the original boundaries of the Uintah Reservation. Officials
from these governmental organizations claimed that the jurisdiction of the Utes
wrongly included them and they urged their constituents to resist compliance with
the Ute Law and Order Code. The State of Utah9 also alleged that the code likewise
impaired its authority.
The Duchesne City Council defiantly announced it would not recognize the
code: "This code unconstitutionally establishes another level of government.... We

7The secretary of the interior had to sign the ordinance concerning liquor
licenses before it could take effect. When the issue first exploded, the secretary had
not yet approved the law.
8Karen Gilmour, "Utes Stir Drink Uproar," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 5
September 1975, Clipping Files, Ute Indians 1963-1990, Special Collections,
Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. (Hereafter CF, UI63-90).
9From here on, the term "State of Utah" refers to the governmental agencies
making up the executive branch of Utah's state government, including its legal
representation as provided by the state attorney general's office.
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protest anyone giving jurisdiction over non-Indians or non-Indian land.,,10 Duchesne
city officials adjured citizens to write to state representatives, senators,
congressmen, the governor, the attorney general, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
the secretary of the interior to express their concerns in an attempt to block
administration of the code. A week later, Utah Governor Calvin Rampton stated he
al,so would resist Ute enforcement of the code over the lands in contention: "I
believe it would be intolerable to have the tribe's sovereign jurisdiction extend to the
large area which is now owned and occupied principally by non-Indians.,,11
;

The Utes faced mounting opposition to their legal power. In response, the
tribe commenced legal action and filed a claim on 14 October 1975 with the U.S.
District Court of Utah in an attempt to gain a clear definition of its reservation
boundaries, and in turn, its own jurisdiction. The suit alleged that the State of Utah,
through the leadership of Governor Rampton, urged citizens to ignore the Law and
Order Code. It also charged that Duchesne County officials publicly maintained that
they would "defy" the code and encouraged other citizens to do the same. The
complaint asked for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prohibit
interference of the code's enforcement and implementation.

lO"Indian Code 'Illegal'," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 29 September 1975,
CF, UI 63-90; Goldie Wilcken, "Duchesne Fights Ute Code," Salt Lake City
Deseret News, 29 September 1975, CF, UI 63-90.
11" A

Check of Roads Closed by Indians," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 14
October 1975, CF, UI 63-90; Maxine Martz, "Utes Suing to Settle Dispute Over
Code," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 15 October 1975, CF, UI 63-90.
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Lester Chapoose, chairman of the Ute Indian Tribal Business Committee,
assiduously propounded the legitimacy of the code at a press conference announcing
the lawsuit:
We will no longer stand idly by and watch ... our competency
questioned .. .. I view this code as a step forward for my people ....
Those who oppose the assertion of tribal rights either misunderstand
our purpose or would like to relegate us to the shadows of the council
fire as a tourist curiosity. 12
U.S. District Court Judge Willis Ritter issued a restraining order against the
governmental agencies named in the suit, restraining the state from exercising any
~

form of criminal or civil jurisdiction that interfered with any activity or business of
the Utes.
The announcement of the case provoked hostilities between Indians and
whites in the Uintah Basin. The Duchesne County Sheriff's Department instructed
deputies on how to deal with "Indian trouble" and the Roosevelt Police Department
began receiving crank calls, one of which came from a caller who asked if
Roosevelt wanted another "Wounded Knee. ,,13 The Utes closed roads through the

12"Tribe Files Suit to Protect Laws of Utes," Salt Lake City Deseret News,
16 October 1975, CF, UI 63-90; George Raine, "Indians File Suit to Contest Value
of Code," Salt Lake City Tribune, 16 October 1975, sec. B, p. 1.

l30n 27 February 1973 a group of armed and militant Indians seized and
occupied the hamlet of Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South
Dakota in an effort to call national attention to Native American problems. The
occupation, orchestrated by the American Indian Movement (AIM), resulted in an
armed stand-off between the FBI and the Indians that lasted for over seventy days
and ended peacefully on 8 May 1973. For further information see: Stanley David
Lyman, Wounded Knee 1973, with a Foreword by Alvin M. Josephy, eds. Floyd A.
O'Neil, June K. Lyman, and Susan McKay (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1991); Vine Deloria, Jr., Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An American Indian
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reservation, an action that raised

wO~,r.ies

about confrontations at tribal roadblocks

and angered Utah hunters, who used the roads for access to public lands.
Many whites misinterpreted Ute intentions and feared that a Ute legal victory
would result in the loss of title to their land. A Roosevelt woman illustrated such
consternation, stating, "Now they want us under their jurisdiction. I'll leave here if
it comes to that. But I'll bum my house before I gO.,,14 The Utes tried to palliate
these anxieties by reiterating that they had no intention of taking white land, but at
the same time Indian leaders fiercely affirmed the legality of Ute jurisdiction
over
t
the area. The situation bordered on violent confrontation. A white resident, who
formerly worked for the Utes, warned, "If the court rules in the Indians' favor,
there will be a range war out here. ,,15
In an attempt at conciliation, Senator Jake Gam (R-Utah) met with local
townspeople and Ute governmental officials to hear views regarding the
jurisdictional conflict. Although the two parties agreed on very little, the session
eased tensions. Utes criticized talk of violence by non-Indians and Senator Gam
placated white citizens when he promised to take the issue to Congress if the courts

Declaration of Independence (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); Prucha,
The Great Father, 366-67.
14Karen Gilmour, "Ute Code Stirs Up Some Old Disputes," Salt Lake City
Deseret News, 20 October 1975, CF, UI 63-90.
lSIbid.
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found in favor of the Utes. The meeting, however! did not resolve the
disagreement. 16
Hoping to avoid litigation, Governor Rampton asked to meet with Ute Tribal
Business Committee members. The governor and the Utes gathered on 30 October
1975 at Bottle Hollow Resort to arbitrate differences. Recognizing that a decision
from the courts could take years, Governor Rampton proposed an interim solution
aimed at preventing "misunderstandings and bad feelings" between Indians and
whites in the Uintah Basin. The governor's plan suggested that both Indian and
~

non-Indian courts grant individuals arrested for misdemeanors or traffic violations
within the reservation a change of venue to the court of their choice. 17
The next day, in a letter to the governor, the Utes unanimously dismissed
Rampton's peace-keeping plan and stated they would continue to hold whites
accountable under the edicts of the Law and Order Code. IS Tribal Chairman
Chapoose said the Utes would not "give up the idea that they can not govern
themselves on their own land. ,,19 The rejection frustrated and discouraged

16Karen Gilmour, "Confrontation Over Ute Law is Avoided," Salt Lake City
Deseret News, 18 October 1975, CF, UI 63-90; Douglas L. Parker, "Ute Leaders,
Neighbors Confer In Dispute Over Jurisdiction," Salt Lake City Tribune, 18
October 1975, sec. B, p. 1.
17"Utes, Whites Like a Choice of Court, " Salt Lake City Deseret News, 30
October 1975, CF, UI 63-90; "Governor Meets with Factions on Tribal Code
Question," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin Standard, 6 November 1975.
lS"Utes Reject Change of Venue Plan," Salt Lake City Deseret News; 31
October 1975, CF, UI 63-90.
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Rampton: "where I go from here I don't know ... ·... To have the whites subject to a
government in which they have no voting power is contrary to our concept of
democracy. ,,20 Each group's intransigence created an impasse.
The stand-off kindled new rancor in the basin, this time over a different
issue. Whites in the region increasingly resented perceived Ute wealth. Although
many individual Utes lived in poverty, proceeds from Ute mineral leases and other
business endeavors drew considerable attention. From 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975,
Other
the Vtes had collected over seven million dollars in oil and gas roya,lties.
1
dividends from tribal investments totaled $440,000. "Let's face it, these people are
rich. There isn't a white person out here who wouldn't change places with anyone
of them," Duchesne County Sheriff George Marret caustically remarked. 21 The
Roosevelt City Commission complained that the Utes received disproportionate
amounts of federal grants and aid compared to other basin citizens.
The fact that federal law exempted the Utes from state property and income
taxes on trust lands and allowed the Indians to collect state sales taxes without
remitting excise profits further incited white resentment. Non-Indians felt it unfair
that the Vtes, privileged with these dispensations, could still take advantage of state

19"Utes Reject Peace Plan by Gov. Rampton," Vernal (Utah) Express, 6
November 1975.
2O"Rampton Stumped," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 1 November 1975,
CF, VI 63-90.
21Gilmour, "Ute Code Stirs Disputes," Salt Lake City Deseret News, CF, UI
63-90.
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education, welfare, and social service programs. 22 Many Utes responded,
reminding white residents that Indians paid federal taxes and provided jobs for
numerous non-Indians in the community. 23 The Utes also contributed abundantly to
the economic well-being of the area, providing over twelve million dollars to the
basin economy.
After fourteen months of stalemate and derision over the jurisdiction dispute,
the election of a new state governor, Scott Matheson, brought the debate back to the
forefront of Utah politics. Governor Matheson exposed the controyersy to public
scrutiny in the most intense light yet. In March 1977, following a series of
discussions among DaHin Jensen, Assistant Utah Attorney General; Richard
Dewsnup, Special Assistant Utah Attorney General; and Stephen Boyden, attorney
for the Utes, Matheson announced that the state and the Utes had drafted a tentative
proposal aimed at ending the disagreement. 24
The agreement contained several important provisions. It outlined the
original exterior boundary of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation as the one established
by the executive orders of 1861 and 1882.

It granted the Utes the right to hunt,

fish, and trap within the original boundaries of the reservation, subject only to the

22"Utes Receive Too Much Aid, Roosevelt Officials Say," Salt Lake City
Deseret News, 10 January 1977, CF, UI63-90.
23In 1977, the Utes employed 197 non-Indians in various types of
employment. Linda Garcia and Cecelia Jenks, Letter to the Editor, Roosevelt (Utah)
Uintah Basin Standard, 7 April 1977.
24Roger Pusey, "State, Utes Draft Agreement," Salt Lake City Deseret
News, 30 March 1977, CF, UI 63-90.
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control and regulation of the tribe. The accord provided concurrent criminal
jurisdiction between the state and the Utes over various misdemeanor and traffic
violations within the exterior boundaries and proposed cross-deputizing state and
tribal enforcement officers.
The most controversial condition in the agreement dealt with taxation. The
arrangement specified that the Utes would not directly tax non-Indians or levy taxes
on minerals extracted in the territory. Instead, the state promised to give the Utes a
region. The
proportional share of all mineral and sales tax revenues collected in.the
t
plan based the distribution of tax yields on the ratio of Indians to whites in the basin.
Thus, the Utes would have shared in state taxes from resources in the area such as
oil, gas, and oil shale and stood to gain eight-million dollars a year from these
revenues. Ratification of the compact required approval of the Utes, the Utah
legislature, and the United States Congress. 25
Distribution of the plan to city, county, and state officials produced a vortex
of angry protest. Upset by their exclusion from the negotiations, city and county
officers in the basin called the proposal an infringement on the rights of nonIndians. Most whites in the basin felt the arrangement ignored their demands and
did not constitute a compromise. Tom Tobin, attorney for Duchesne County,
summed up this attitude: "The agreement would give the Indians more power than

2SPusey, "State, Utes Draft Agreement," Salt Lake City Deseret News;
"Indian Boundary Claim Takes in Oil Shale Lands," Vernal (Utah) Express, 31
March 1977; "Agreement Proposed to Resolve Jurisdiction Dispute with State," Ute
Bulletin, 6 April 1977, p. 6.

61
if they won every lawsuit filed in connection with this problem." An editorial
appearing in the Uintah Basin Standard attacked the proposal for dismissing local
non-Indian concerns: "To suggest an 'agreement' between two parties, where the
actual parties involved are not entirely defined ... and where the parties had no input
as to content, is rather asinine." Further objections came from Uintah County
Commissioner Neal Domgaard and Roosevelt Mayor Hollis Hullinger. Domgaard
opposed the document because, "It talks about the original exterior boundary, and
we don't accept that." Hullinger asked why the state had to share

ijiX

revenues with

the Utes: "Many Indians don't pay taxes to support ... state programs, but they get
the benefits. The tribe has many millions in savings, untaxable, and the Indian
lands provide no tax revenue .... Why must we defend the right to administer our
own governments?,,26 At the same time, state sportsmen reacted to the provisions
granting Utes increased hunting privileges by accusing the governor of "selling-out"
Utah hunters.
Ute attorney Stephen Boyden answered the criticism: "The tribe does not
intend to exercise unrighteous dominion ... They are only interested in governing
themselves and protecting their own interests. ,,27 The bitterness the draft agreement

26"Basin Official Cool About Out-of-Court Ute Settlement," Roosevelt
(Utah) Uintah Basin Standard, 7 April 1977; Editorial, "Action is Needed Now!,"
Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin Standard, 7 April 1977. Robert S. Halliday, "Ute
Indian Jurisdiction Proposal Draws Officials' Objections," Salt Lake City Tribune,
31 March 1977, sec. B, p. 4; Ibid.
27 "

Standard.

Basin Officials Cool About Settlement," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin
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provoked discouraged Utah Attorney General Bob Hansen. At a meeting for basin
officials to present their objections to the plan, Hansen said he "got the feeling the
Uintah Basin doesn't want to come to an agreement," and added, "I gather there is
no area of give for the average basin citizen in this document. ,,28
In April 1977, Governor Matheson tried to assuage both sides by appointing
a twenty-five-member panel to work toward resolution of the troubles between the
Utes and whites. The select group included representatives from state government,
federal government, Duchesne and Uintah counties, eastern Utah -municipalities, and
~

the Utes. Matheson asked the committee to further review the draft proposal
between the state and Indians. The governor reiterated his belief that the accord, if
agreed upon, provided a fair settlement of most points in contention. 29
As in all efforts preceding it, this attempt at rapprochement ran into serious
obstacles. At the first meeting of the panel on 18 April 1977, Duchesne County
Attorney Leroy Park stated that his constituents were not interested in substituting
the jurisdiction agreement for the lawsuit: "There is no way we are going to resolve
the issue of the reservation boundary by a discussion." Loryn Ross, Duchesne
County Commissioner, did not see any benefits to signing the agreement: "What
could the tribe give us that we haven't already got?" Both Ute and basin officials

2S"Basin Officials Cool Ute Settlement," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin
Standard; Halliday, "Ute Proposal Draws Objections," Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 4.
29"Panel Assigned to Ute Dispute," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 15 April
1977, CF, UI63-90; "State Panel to Review Ute Tribe Conflicts," Salt Lake City
Tribune, 17 April 1977, sec. B, p. 4.
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did agree on one point; the two sides could not make a final decision without
settlement of the boundary question. Once again, negotiations slowed to a standstill.
After only two discussion sessions, the special committee abandoned its
efforts to resolve the jurisdiction argument. On 26 April 1977, Bruce Parry,
chairman of the panel, canceled the final three scheduled meetings of the committee.
"No one can make any substantial tradeoffs," Parry commented. 30
Two weeks later, the State of Utah took dramatic action. The state asked the
had no effect
federal district court of Utah to rule that the Ute Law and Order Code
;
beyond the trust lands of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation. In a motion for summary
judgmenf 1 , the state asked Chief Judge Ritter to determine that early-twentiethcentury congressional action had "disestablished" the original boundaries of the
reservation. Additionally, the state asked Judge Ritter to reserve judgment on the
validity of the code until the boundaries were determined. The state presented a
stack of affidavits from fish and game officers, elected officials, and others. The
affidavits maintained that legislative, administrative, and political actions taken by
various government agencies since the removal of the land from the reservation

30"Duchesne Meeting of Governor's Committee Finds Little Agreement,"
Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin Standard, 28 April 1977; "Panel Abandons Efforts to
Settle Ute Land Dispute," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 27 April 1977, CF, UI63-

90.
A summary judgment is a preverdict judgment of a court rendered when
the court perceives that only questions of law are in dispute, or that the court's
decision must be the same regardless of which party's version of the facts the court
accepts. It is a device designed to promptly decide controversies on their merits
without resort to a lengthy trial. Gifis, Dictionary of Legal Terms, 422-23
31
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proved that the land belonged in the public domain. 32 Ritter delayed hearing of the
motion. He had made an earlier determination to postpone the case, along with
several others, and moved it to his fall calendar.
By the fall of 1977, the tug-of-war over the challenged lands in the Uintah
Basin had deepened the already bitter feelings that adoption of the Ute Law and
Order Code had engendered three years earlier. Both groups obstinately supported
their original stances concerning Indian jurisdiction, hunting rights, and taxation.
conflict
Acrimony resulted in more threats and increased worries about armed
I
between Indians and non-Indians.
With the approach of the 1977 Utah hunting season, the Utes once again
closed access reservation roads, which led to some of the most productive hunting
areas in the state. This outraged non-Indian hunters, who, in turn, threatened to go
hunting on the disputed lands despite Ute warnings. Duchesne and Uintah county
officials cautioned that the Utes' "flexing of muscles" would lead to eventual
violence. "There's going to be shooting," stated one Uintah County
commissioner. 33
The growing friction exposed latent white prejudices and racism. In
language that recalled termination rhetoric from the 1950s, many whites demanded

32"State Files Ute Motion," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 30 April 1977,
CF, UI63-9O; "Limit Utes' Control, State's Motion Asks," Salt Lake City Tribune,
1 May 1977, sec. B, p. 2.
33"Hunt Violence Feared in Uintah," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 24 May
1977, CF, UI63-9O.
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that the federal government abolish the "special privileges" it afforded Indian
groups. Roosevelt Mayor Hullinger supported this idea: "The Indian has been held
down all too long by regulatory authority. He needs his freedom to be able to
grow. Now is the time for action ... Make a plan fOf. .. certain termination." Many
basin citizens agreed. " Abolish All Indian Reservations. The Federal
Government ... should buy all remaining Indian land," a letter to the editor of the
Uintah Basin Standard suggested. Other local residents fostered the idea of an
innate moral claim to the land, a position that reflected white attituges of racial
~

superiority. "It was the efforts of the white man that made the cOuntry [the Uintah
Basin] what it is today," argued Duchesne County Commissioner J. Rulan
Anderton. 34
Acting on these prejudicial sentiments, many residents of Duchesne County
formed a loose union with the Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and
Responsibilities (ICERR), a national backlash group against Indian claims. 35 In fact,
the ICERR named Roosevelt Mayor Hullinger as its first vice president. The

34" Jurisdiction Aid Asked of Solons," Salt Lake City Tribune, 24 May 1977,
sec. B, p. 11; Reid Bunch, Letter to the Editor, Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin
Standard, 21 April 1977; J. Rulan Anderton, Letter to the Editor, Roosevelt (Utah)
Uintah Basin Standard, 8 March 1979.

Anti-Indian groups in Washington State, Montana, and South Dakota
formed the ICERR in February 1976. The association intended to fight what it
perceived as federal discrimination against the white majority. Senator Mark
Hatfield (R-Oregon) characterized the anger focused by the group as "a very
significant backlash that by any other name comes out as racism in all its ugly
manifestations." Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse (New York:
Penguin Books, 1980), 318-19.
35
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ICERR had adopted the resolution "that all state and local laws shall apply within all
reservations and to all tribes and tribal members." The organization also held that
"the constitutional rights of all Americans must supersede treaty rights of some
Americans. ,,36
The Utes labeled white association with the ICERR, along with several other
white actions, as an additional example of the prejudice and discrimination they had
endured since first deprived of their lands during the westward migration of AngloAmericans. The editor of the Ute Bulletin, Maxine Natchees, maintained that Ute
assumption of more power in eastern Utah
brought into the open years of suppressed prejudice, fear and suspicion
by our White neighbors. Even as the contents of the Law and Order
was [sic] introduced in 1975 ... it brought fear that we were going to
take over the Uintah Basin with our claim of jurisdiction .... the Law
and Order Code .. .is a vehicle in our climb to self-determination and
self-sufficiency. 37
"We want fairness," explained new Tribal Business Committee Chairperson Ruby
Black. Vice Chairman Charles Redfoot added, "We want our people to prosper in
this modern world and be a part of it. ,,38

36Robert S. Halliday, "Ute Indian Code Puts Established Order Under
Siege," Salt Lake City Tribune, 4 August 1979, sec. B, p. 1.
37Maxine Natchees, "Jurisdiction Barrier to Compact," Ute Bulletin,
January-February 1979.
38Natchees, "Jurisdiction Barrier to Compact," Ute Bulletin; "Indians,
Whites Battle for Lands," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 1 August 1977, CF, UI 63-

90.
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Malevolence widened the gap of misunderstanding between the two basin
groups and destroyed prospects of a peaceful resolution. Beginning in the summer
of 1977 and continuing into early 1978, attorneys for each litigant started filing
evidential exhibits with the court in preparation for trial. Although both whites and
Indians still wished for an out-of-court arrangement and continued negotiations,
neither side made any conciliatory moves in late 1977.
Governor Matheson, on the other hand, did make another overture towards
mediated settlement. In December 1977, Matheson established sevpral task forces
and instructed them to conduct comprehensive investigations into the debated issues
between the counties and cities of the Uintah Basin and the Utes. 39 The collective
findings of the individual task forces would serve as a tentative state position and a
basis for negotiating with the Utes to arrive at a compromise accord. The task
forces quickly went to work, but the work assigned to some of these groups proved
more formidable and time-consuming than anticipated. Due to the delays, Matheson
decided to instruct the task forces to begin negotiations with the Utes even though
some of the groups had not finalized their recommendations. These discussions
continued sporadically over the next several months.40

39'fhe task forces comprised of representatives from federal, state, county,
and city agencies interested in the disputed issues. They included: the Utah Division
of Indian Affairs, Duchesne City Manager, Utah State Engineer, Utah Wildlife
Resources Division, Utah Attorney General's Office, Bureau of Land Management,
Forest Service, Bureau of Reclamation, and Department of the Interior. For more
information see: Robert S. Halliday, "Settlement Proposed in Long Ute Dispute,"
Salt Lake City Tribune, 12 January 1979, sec. B, p. 1-2.
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In what.came as a surprise, in late February 1978 the State of Utah made an
additional move towards appeasement. The state withdrew its request for a
summary judgment by the district court. The motion to withdraw explained the
state's placatory act by asserting that "the parties to this action are currently
engaged in ... sensitive negotiations and .... [the pursuit of litigation] will have a
substantial adverse impact on the present negotiations. "41
Reflecting the progress made in these "sensitive" discussions, that same
month Matheson requested that the Utah Legislature create an ad poe legislative
committee to draw up a compromise statute to submit to the legislature. It complied
and in November 1978 the task forces submitted their reports to the committee. The
Utes also presented a proposal to the committee. Prospects for a resolution seemed

Optimism subsided when the committee could not agree on a compact that it
could recommend to the legislature for ratification and approval. Disagreements
over possible solutions to the boundary argument remained the toughest sticking
point. The chairman of the committee, state senator Glade Sowards (R-Vernal),

4O"Govemor Hopes Compact Negotiations Continue," Roosevelt (Utah)
Uintah Basin Standard, 15 March 1979. Contents of this article consist of an open
letter to the people of Utah that Governor Matheson had issued and the Uintah Basin
Standard reprinted in its entirety.
41"Utah Drops Motion in Ute Lawsuit," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 2
March 1978, CF, UI63-90.
42"Governor Hopes Negotiations Continue," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin
Standard.
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wanted more time. Also, on 1 December 1978 the Utes shocked state officials when
they delivered a resolution to Governor Matheson claiming 500,000 acre feet of
water annually from streams in the Uintah Basin. This development, along with the
committee's deadlock, darkened the possibility of reaching a bargain. Cognizant of
the growing impatience of the two factions involved in the dispute, state
representative DeMont Judd felt that the legislature had to address the problem
during the 1979 session to avoid the pursuit of court action by the litigants. Judd
made plans to introduce a bill into the Utah Legislature consisting pf the Utes'
proposal to the ad hoc committee. 43
The Indian plan, called the Ute Indian Compact, contained concessions by
both parties different from the introductory draft agreement of 1977. First, the
compact recognized the initial 1861 reservation boundaries, but returned the
prosecution of civil and criminal cases to their pre-1975 practice. State courts
would try non-Indians arrested anywhere in the reservation, while tribal or federal
courts would judge Utes apprehended in the area. Secondly, the compact required
Utes to pay state sales taxes, from which they had previously enjoyed exemption.
However, the state agreed to return a proportional share of all excise revenues
collected in the area to the Utes. This rebate included state sales, cigarette, alcohol,
transient room, and fuel taxes. Lastly, the document set Ute water usage levels at

43Robert S. Halliday, "Utah Solons May Settle Ute Conflict: Matheson Urges
New Approach," Salt Lake City Tribune, 4 January 1979, sec. B, p. 1.
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258,900 acre-feet annually, 200,000 acre-feet less than the Indians had claimed only
one month earlier. 44
In comparison to the prior agreement, this new proposal removed
stipulations for concurrent criminal and civil jurisdiction and restricted Ute powers
to tax on non-trust lands. The Ute Indian Compact did, however, keep the
provision granting Indians the right to hunt, fish, and trap anywhere on ,the
reservation, subject only to Ute regulation. If approved by the Utah Legislature,
stipulations in the pact made it binding to both groups with the approval of the Utes,
~

the secretary of the interior, and the United States Congress.
Announcement of Ute Indian Compact elicited the same vehement response
from Uintah Basin officials that introduction of the older 1977 compromise had
twenty-two months earlier. County and municipal governments renounced the
compact's provisions dealing with Indian hunting and taxing privileges and attacked
the proposal's acknowledgment of the 1861 reservation boundary. Newly elected
Roosevelt Mayor Ralph Shields characterized the agreement as "detrimental to all
the people in the Basin. ,,45

44Halliday, "Solons May Settle Conflict," Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 1;
Halliday, "Settlement Proposed in Dispute," Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 1-2; "Ute
Tribe to Offer Agreement Compromise to Utah Legislature, " Vernal (Utah)
Express, 18 January 1979~ Bob Bernick, Jr., "Time Grows Short for Ute
Proposal," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 2 February 1979, CF, UI63-90.

4s"Local Officials Oppose Draft Indian Agreement," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah
Basin Standard, 4 January 1979.
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Recognition of the 1861 reservation boundaries drew the most fire from
basin officials. They adamantly refused to accept that demarcation. "Until the tribe
takes out that exterior boundary, there's no way we can accept it [the compact],"
Neal Domgaard said implacably.

Others questioned the legality of the state

legislature determining the reservation boundaries. "If the Legislature passes this
compact it is re-creating an Indian reservation. Only the federal government has the
power to do that," stated Tom Tobin, an Indian law expert hired by Duchesne and
Uintah Counties. 46 Although the Ute Compact greatly curbed IndJan authority over
#

non-trust lands, eastern Utah residents perceived the acknowledgment of the old
boundary as a direct threat. They feared that if they conceded the existence of the
original boundaries, in the future the Utes might renege on the arrangement and
assert jurisdiction over non-Indians. 47
The compact's shortfalls galvanized basin officials' determination to seek a
court ruling in the dispute. On 16 January 1979, the Duchesne and Uintah County
Commissions, along with the Roosevelt City Council, passed a resolution opposing
the compact. Basin officials had reached exasperation and preferred to take their
chances in court. "We believe we can win a boundary fight in U.S. District
Court," concluded Tom Tobin. Roosevelt Mayor Shields said, "Even if we lose the

46"Basin Officials Oppose Ute Tribe Dispute Compact," Vernal (Utah)
Express, 25 January 1979; Bernick, "Time Short for Proposal," Salt Lake City
Deseret News, CF, UI 63-90.
47Lavarr Webb, "Ute Pact Hinges on Only a Few Items," Salt Lake City
Deseret News, 20 June 1979, CF, UI63-90.
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.-

boundary issue in court, we're no worse off than with this proposed agreement."
He added, "'We're tired of all this haggling." Roosevelt and Duchesne residents
began organizing to form lobbying groups to fight the compact in the Utah
Legislature. 48
In late December and early January, several state legislators outwardly
expressed their opposition to the compact. Governor Matheson understood that the
Ute Indian Compact faced stout resistance in the Utah Legislature and feared that the
dispute was headed for the federal district court. Matheson remained determined to
~

avoid litigation. The indefatigable governor refused to let the issue stagnate,
concerned that inaction would only further embitter the already hard feelings
between the two groups.
Thus motivated, Governor Matheson inaugurated a new path to conciliation.
On 3 January 1979, he announced his proposal to form a mediation group consisting
of county commissioners from Duchesne and Uintah counties; delegates from
Duchesne, Roosevelt, and Vernal; two members from the Utah Attorney General's
Office, and Indian representatives. Knowing that the Ute Indian Compact had very
little likelihood of passing through the legislature, the governor hoped this group
could renew discussions and forge another draft agreement to submit to Utah

48Bernick, "'Time Short for Proposal," Salt Lake City Deseret News, CF, UI
63-90; "Basin Officials Oppose Compact," Vernal (Utah) Express; "2 Counties
Reject Indian Claim Pact," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 18 January 1979, CF, UI
63-90.
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lawmakers' for their consideration. The governor's plan would never come to
fruition. 49
Nevertheless, the State of Utah and the Ute Indian Tribe now sought a delay
in court action to allow this latest attempt at compromise to run its course. Both
parties met in a status hearing on 4 January 1979 before new U.S. District Judge
Bruce Jenkins, who had replaced Judge Willis Ritter. Judge Jenkins granted a
continuance in the case until 30 March 1979, after the Utah legislative session
ended, providing the legislature time to attempt a statute solution. Jenkins warned,
~

however, that legislators sometimes were "not anxious" to settle controversial issues
pending before the courts. His admonition proved poignantly true. so
Despite staunch basin government opposition to the compact, in February
1979, state representative Judd introduced the Ute Indian Compact (identified as HB
400) into the Utah House of Representatives. Previously, several state assemblymen
had made public statements doubting that the legislature had enough time to act on
the measure. "I don't think it would be physically possible to present the compact
to the legislature this session," reasoned State Senator Sowards. 51

49Halliday, "Solons May Settle Conflict," Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 1;
Editorial, Salt Lake City Deseret News, 5 January 1979, CF, UI 63-90.
SOCivil Docket Sheet, Proceedings, Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521
F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981), Docket Num. C 75-408, p. 3; "Jurisdiction
Question in Court, New Draft to Go to Legislature," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah
Basin Standard, 11 January 1979.
s1Robert S. Halliday, "Legislature or Courts to Hear Ute Claims," Salt Lake
City Tribune, 13 January 1979, sec. B, p. 2.
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Indeed, it did prove difficult for the state legislature to address the proposed
statute during its 1979 session. Eastern Utah interest groups had successfully
lobbied state legislators to pigeonhole the compact legislation. 52 By early March,
less than a week before the close of the session, the legislature had not acted on the
bill. This inaction drew an angry and excoriating response from the Utes. Tribal
Chairperson Ruby Black branded the state administration as "irresponsible" and
blamed Governor Matheson for ignoring Indian claims. "To now, we've been very
patient. We're not asking for something that isn't ours," she added. 53
~

Following the Utes' realization that the legislature did not intend to consider
HB 400, the Indians retaliated with a puissant threat. During a press conference on
7 March 1979, the Utes announced that they planned to cancel all existing water
pacts with non-Indians in the basin. This included water supplied to Roosevelt City
by the large Uriah Heap Spring on Indian trust land and Ute participation in the
Central Utah Project. 54 The Uriah Heap Spring provided Roosevelt with half of its
annual culinary water supply.

52In late January 1979, Duchesne County Commission chairman Loryn Ross
had already received State Senator Soward's promise that the compact would not get
through the legislature that year. "'No Indian Compact' Local Officials to Tell
Matheson Today," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin Standard, 18 January 1979.
53"Ute Tribe to Drop All Water Pacts Over Compact Failure," Vernal (Utah)
Express, 8 March 1979.
54In 1948, the upper Colorado River basin states completed an agreement that
defined their respected apportionments of Colorado River water. As a result, in
1956, the State of Utah gained congressional authorization for the Central Utah
Project (CUP). The CUP planned to annually divert 270,000 acre-feet of water
from the Colorado River and the waters flowing from the southern slope of the
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"We're going to cut all the water off.... I'm just Indian-mad at this point,"
Black told reporters. Piqued, Black also avowed that the Utes now would only
accept the original 1977 agreement as a means of solution to the jurisdiction dispute.
Perhaps of more import than the threats, however, was Black's revelation that the
Utes were ready to pursue litigation. "We are ready to got to court," she stated at
the news conference, "We're not losing anything, whether we win or lose." As a
result, basin officials and Ute leaders now prepared to abandon negotiation and
exposed their inclination to face-off in court. 55
The State of Utah, led by Governor Matheson's unyielding desire to avert
court action, had not given up on the prospects of a negotiated settlement. On 8
March 1979, the day the Utah legislative session was scheduled to end, Governor
Matheson attempted one last frantic effort to gain a statutory settlement. The Ute
water threats had caught state legislators' attention and spurred the legislature into a

Uintah Mountains for carry to urban regions around Salt Lake City. In 1965, CUP
supporters signed an agreement (the 1965 Deferral Agreement) with the Utes that
promised the Indians a large water project if they would defer using water on fifteen
thousand acres of their irrigable lands until the year 2005. The Utes also agreed to
defer their water diversion rights from the Rock Creek and Duchesne Rivers, thus
freeing that water flow for transport over the Uintah Mountains to the heavily
populated Wasatch Front. Ute water constituted forty thousand annual acre-feet of
the CUP's diversion total. For more information see: "The CUP Story," High
Country News, Special Issue, 15 July 1991; Lloyd Burton, American Indian Water
Rights and the Limits of Law (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991), 68,
74; Marc ReIsner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water
(New York: Viking Penguin, 1986), 301; Philip L. Fradkin, Sagebrush Country:
Land and the American West (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989) 245.
55Ute Tribe to Drop All Water Pacts Over Compact Failure," Vernal (Utah)
Express, 8 March 1979; Robert S. Halliday, "State Ponders Reaction to Ute
Claims," Salt Lake City Tribune, 8 March 1979, sec. B, p. 1.
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frenetic attempt to work with the governor before the legislature's final midnight
deadline.
Hoping to get both factions back to the negotiating table, Matheson
introduced a last-minute substitute measure detailing the state's desired version of
the compact, covering the same issues, but with different stipulations needed for
state acquiescence. At a press conference in the afternoon of March 8, Matheson
explained that he realized that in the closing hours of the session little prospect
existed for passing either the state or Indian bill. Instead, he hopep his attempt
i

would allow further bargaining by both parties. Elements and provisions of the
counter-offer remained "negotiable as far as I am concerned," he told reporters. 56
Members of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, who had come to Salt Lake
City for the closing legislative round, rejected the state offer. Ruby Black thought
the state counter-proposal made too many substantive changes. The water issue
alone, on which both sides appeared closest to agreement in the Ute Indian
Compact, contained over ten revisions in the new Matheson plan. 57

56Robert S. Halliday, "Indians Reject State Offer in Land Case," Salt Lake
City Tribune, 9 March 1979, sec. B, p. 1.
571n spite of the Ute refusal to negotiate a new compact, the Indians did agree
to try to work out accords on two topics peripheral to the jurisdiction question:
water rights and hunting privileges. Fresh negotiations began in the afternoon of
March 8, hours before the close of the session. The two factions resolved the water
rights controversy rapidly. By the early evening, the Utes had bargained for a plan
that granted them use of over one-fourth of Utah's entitlement to the Colorado and
Green Rivers. This included over 700,000 annual acre-feet of water for irrigation
purposes alone. The hunting dispute proved considerably more difficult to decide.
The Utes insisted on linking fishing and hunting concessions with water rights. The
Indians firmly held to the position that if the two groups could not reach an
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Both litigants had publicly announced their willingness to pursue court action
to resolve the issues and continued to make confrontational statements. Still, each
did not seem willing to terminate repeated efforts at reconciliation.

Both

recognized that a poor outcome in the district court's finding could deal a major
blow to their causes. Instead of gambling with a judicial decision, both groups
pursued new talks, thinking that a negotiated settlement might produce a more
beneficial, and less risky, result for their demands.
With this in mind, after the failed legislative attempt, the Utes recanted their
water threats. Governor Matheson, encouraged by the progress made at the lastditch legislative bargaining session, told the press that if each side could reach a
substantial understanding, he might call a special session of the legislature to decide
the matter later that year.

understanding on hunting, they would withdraw from the water rights arrangement.
Thus, hunting rights became the pivotal issue on the evening of March 8. In
particular, the topic of deer hunting caused considerable strife. The Utes wished to
take an annual maximum of two thousand deer from non-trust lands within the
reservation. This constituted an additional one thousand more deer than the stateproposed maximum ..The Indians also wanted a seven-month, rather than a state
proposed 6O-day, hunting season. Although both sides eventually agreed to an
acceptable maximum of fifteen hundred deer, the Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources and the Utes could not concur on a suitable length for an Indian hunting
season. Each group had made allowances on the issue; the Utes reduced their
demand to a five-month season and the state increased its proposal to ninety days.
Even though the impasse now had reduced to nothing more than a two-month
difference in the length of the hunting season, both the Utes and the state stubbornly
refused to budge on the issue. Exhausted and hamstrung by this latest deadlock,
negotiators ended discussions at 9:30 p.m. the evening of March 8. The standstill
defeated all progress, including the affirmed water agreement. Halliday, "Indians
Reject Offer," Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 1, 4; "Governor Hopes Compact
Negotiations Continue," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin Standard, 15 March 1979.
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Judge Jenkins obliged with this final attempt at arbitration. On 30 March
1979, Jenkins held another pre-trial conference with legal representatives of the
litigants in the case. Jenkins allowed four months for continued talks, but set a
"firm " opening date of 1 August 1979 for the trial. 58
Both groups doggedly returned to negotiations in the spring of 1979. By
June, the state and the Utes had reached a tentative water concord and had nearly
resolved the hunting debate, giving the Utes an expanded deer hunting season. 59
Unfortunately, each group could not find an amicable solution to QIe boundary
t

controversy, central to settlement of all other contentious topics. On 19 June 1979,
Gordon Harmston, the lead negotiator, announced that the state intended to delay
further discussions on the hunting compromise until basin citizens and the Utes
cleared up the local jurisdiction problems. 60

58 Civil Docket Sheet, Proceedings, Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521
F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981), Docket Num. C 75-408, p. 3; Robert S.
Halliday, "Judge Allows Time for Talks in Ute Suit," Salt Lake City Tribune, 31
March 1979, sec. B, p. 1.
5~e water rights dispute necessitated little consideration, since the Utes and
the State of Utah had come to a previous agreement on March 8, during the waning
hours of the 1979 session. Concerning hunting rights, in late March, the Utes had
made a "significant compromise" and agreed to adopt hunting seasons identical to
those for non-Indians, except for deer. The Ute deer season would take into account
year-to-year state conservation concerns and required Indians to obtain permission
from private landowners when hunting of non-trust lands. Halliday, "Judge Allows
Time for Talks, " Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 1.

~ebb, "Ute Pact Hinges on Few Items, " Salt Lake City Deseret News, 20
June 1979, CF, UI 63-90.
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With time running out before Judge Jenkin's August 1 deadline, the State of
Utah understood that unless eastern Utah government officials and Ute leaders could
solve the long-standing jurisdiction and boundary differences, all the parties
involved in the dispute faced an arduous and protracted legal battle. If whites and
Indians truly desired an out-of-court arrangement, the two sides now had to broach
the volatile jurisdiction question.
The deep-seated Indian and white resentments that the Ute's legal complaint
had fomented made the boundary argument practically insurmoun41ble. Over the
~

four years of intermittent negotiation neither side had made any significant
concessions concerning the validity of the boundary lines. So, the chances for
arbitrated settlement appeared dismal.
As in all attempts preceding it, the final determinative effort to resolve
jurisdiction differences collapsed. Even though by July 1979 negotiators had made
some progress in developing a plan that would have allowed a sort of dual
jurisdiction over non-trust lands, the boundary conflict persisted as the bane of
compromise. Illustrating this point, former Roosevelt Mayor Hollis Hullinger
explained the basin officials' position: "If they will reduce their claims to what the
reservation really is [trust lands], it would be a basis for other discussions." Other
local government representatives stubbornly refused to discuss the matter,
reiterating their desire to seek a court judgment. "No way we will compromise. It
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will have to go through the courts. It can't be settled otherwise," proclaimed
Duchesne County Commissioner J. Rulan Anderton. 61
The Utes concurred with the assessment that the boundary conflict
represented the lone setback to reaching agreement. Attorney for the Utes, Stephen
Boyden, reflected this attitude, commenting, "If there is some way the basin
residents can settle on a line ... and still maintain the rights to which each [Indian and
non-Indian] is entitled, we'll have an agreement." But, Boyden remained
pessimistic. According to him, the courts had to decide the subject:
"They're
4
asking us to give up half the reservation .... It's either reservation land or it isn't and
that's up to the courts to decide. It's a non-negotiable item. "62
At the prompting of Governor MathesOn, bargaining .sessions between
representatives from each side proceeded until the opening of the trial on 1 August
1979. But, both groups had already resigned themselves to the inevitable court
action. In July 1979, attorneys for the Utes and the local governments of eastern
Utah finished their preparations for the lengthy federal court case that would
adjudicate the divisive boundary issue, and thereby, also the jurisdiction conflict.
Four years of numerous attempts at negotiated settlement had resulted in very little,
except increased acrimony, enmity, and misconceptions between the Indian and

61Robert S. Halliday, "Negotiation, Compromise Crucial to Ute Settlement,"
Salt Lake City Tribune, 5 August 1979, sec. B, p. "1-2.
62Halliday, "Negotiation Crucial to Settlement," Salt Lake City Tribune, p.
1-2; Robert S. Halliday, "Ute Tribe Refuses to Drop Claim on Lands," Salt Lake
City Tribune, 15 August 1979, sec. B, p. 4.
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white inhabitants of the Uintah Basin. The observation of Ute Tribal Chairperson .
Ruby Black, made shortly after the Utah Legislature's rejection of the Ute Indian
Compact, aptly expressed the frustrations felt by both litigants over the failure of
negotiations: "All this work has gone up in smoke. We can see these signals from
the Reservation. ,,63

63"Tribe, County Officials Go to Washington, Get Conflicting
Commitments," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin Standard, 15 March 1979.
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CHAPTER IV
"THE FEDERAL COURTS ARE AT WAR WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES"

Beginning at 9:30 a.m. on the Wednesday morning of 1 August 1979, U.S.
District Court Judge Bruce Jenkins heard opening statements in the case of Ute
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah in his crowded downtown Salt Lake City courtroom.
Individuals present at the trial, including a cadre of news reporters, observed legal
maneuvers by ten attorneys and listened to testimony from eighteen witnesses as the
Ute jurisdictional hearings progressed over a two-day period. This brief legal
exercise constituted only a modest component of what would become a prolonged
and extensive judicial inquiry. In the end, three separate federal courts heard the
case in a process that took over fourteen years. 1
The testimony presented at the district court trial formed a small portion of
the information submitted by each litigant in support of its position. Lawyers for
the opposing participants had previously submitted more than eight hundred
documentary exhibits" totaling over three thousand pages of text, plus scores of
photographs and maps. Besides giving careful scrutiny to this material, the court
had to study extensive pre-trial memoranda and post-trial briefs presented by the
parties. The court also examined numerous other historical records authenticated in

l"Ute Hearings Open in U.S. District Court," Roosevelt (Utah) Uintah Basin
Standard, 9 August 1979; Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072,
1080 (D. Utah 1981).
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the discovery process but not included in the compilation of joint exhibits. With this
voluminous historical and juridical record before it, the court faced the task of
deciding which party, the Ute Indian Tribe or the State of Utah, retained
jurisdictional authority over the disputed "opened" lands of the Uintah-Ouray
Reservation. 2 To do so, the court endeavored to discover and delineate the original
intent of Congress's statutory work concerning Ute lands.
During the period of federal allotment policy, the methods Congress used to
open reservations varied widely. Some of the legislation directing the allotment of
;

reservations provided for the outright cession of the unalloted lands; some provided
for the restoration of the unallotted lands "to the public domain"; other acts simply
provided for the opening of the unallotted lands for settlement under homesteading
laws; and still other acts mandated allotment without opening the reservations at all.
No specific pattern of congressional intent emerged. 3
The manner in which a surplus land act removed opened lands from an
Indian reservation substantially affected federal, state, or tribal jurisdiction. If
federal law defined the surplus lands as part of "Indian country," it subjected that
land to its authority over state jurisdiction for non-Indian citizens. On the other
hand, if surplus lands fell under federal trust, states exercised civil and criminal
authority over tribal members and nonmembers to the same extent as on all non-

~he Utes claim over the "original boundary" of the Uintah-Ouray

Reservation included the lands of the old Uncompahgre Reservation.
3Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 Supp. 1072, 1152 (D. Utah 1981).
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reservation lands. 4 These circumstances forced courts to examine each
congressional act individually to determine whether Congress intended the language
to diminish the reservation in question. The courts' interpretation of intent defined
the legal boundaries of an Indian reservation and, therefore, the jurisdictional area
applicable to tribal authority. The Ute case intensified the difficulty of this process
because Congress opened these lands through a series of legislative acts instead of a
single piece of legislation.
The Utes argued before the district court that the general

op~ration

of the

#

Dawes General Allotment Act was to allocate and open the Indian reservations while
continuing the reservation status of the lands. The act guaranteed tribal
jurisdictional power over the area in contention. s The State of Utah asserted that the
Dawes Act provided for the opposite--to reduce (or "diminish") the territorial
boundaries of reservations following allotment through the restoration of the
"surplus" unallotted lands to the public domain.
The case centered on three specific questions that demanded judicial
consideration. First, was the Uncompahgre Reservation disestablished or

4Western Attorneys General, American Indian Law Deskbook, 47-48.
SInterestingly, the United States government sided with the Ute position. The
U.S. Justice Department, with the support of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, filed an
amicus curiae ("friend of the court") brief with the court. In the brief, the Justice
Department forwarded its opinion that former congressional statutes had not
disestablished the exterior boundaries of the reservations and that the Indians
maintained jurisdiction. Motion of the United States for Leave to File a Brief as
Amicus Curiea, Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah
1981), Doc. Num. C 75-408.
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diminished by congressional acts of 15 August 1894 and"of 7 June 1897? Second,
was the Uintah Reservation diminished by a congressional act of 3 March 1905?
Last, did the same 1905 act diminish the Uintah Reservation by its withdrawal of
national forest lands? The three federal courts that eventually heard arguments on
the case answered these questions in different manners and with differing results.

On 19 June 1981, twenty-six months after Judge Jenkins had heard opening
arguments, the United States District Court of Utah handed down its 174-page
decision.
The district court first addressed the legal status of the Uncompahgre
reservation. The initial bill passed by Congress that dealt with the lands of the
reservation was the Indian Appropriations Act of 1894. It included the statement:
Said commissioners shall ... report to the Secretary of the Interior what
portions of said reservation are unsuited or will not be required for
allotments, and thereupon such portions so reported shall, by
proclamation, be restored to the public domain and made subject to as
entry hereinafter provided. 6 (Emphasis added).
Courts traditionally have treated the expression "restored to the public domain,"
when used as the sole operative phrase, as compelling evidence that Congress
intended to strip lands of their former reservation status. The Indian Appropriations
Act of 1897 did not precisely mirror the "public domain" language of the first bill.
It provided:

6An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department, Statutes at Large, 28, chap. 290, 286 (1894).
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All the lands of said Uncompahgre Reservation not therefore allotted
in severalty ... shall ... be opened for location and entry under all the
land laws of the United States. 7 (Emphasis added).
The Ute argued that the original boundaries of the reservation remained intact
because the provisions of the 1897 act overrode the 1894 act. The 1897 act did not
precisely mirror the "public domain" language of the first bill. The Utes contended
that the 1897 act repealed the 1894 statute, "defeating any 'baseline purpose' of
disestablishment arising from the public domain language. ,,8
The district court found otherwise. The court relied on pr~dent from the
Supreme Court case Seymour v. Superintendent. In Seymour, the Supreme Court
held that explicit language restoring most of an Indian reservation to the public
domain plainly suited disestablishment. In Seymour, a similar statute to the 1894
act "vacated and restored to the public domain" the northern half of the Colville
Reservation in the State of Washington.
The district court used the Seymour decision to find that the terms of the
1894 act expressed in plain language Congress's intent to disestablish the
Uncompahgre Reservation, following the distribution of allotments; Congress
wished to restore the "surplus" lands to the "public domain." Although the
government failed to carry out the terms of the 1894 act, the court stated that
Congress passed the 1897 act to fulfill the purpose of releasing the remaining lands

7An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department, Statutes at Large, 30, chap. 3, 87 (1897).
8Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1106 (D. Utah
1981).
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for white settlement. The 1894 statute provided the historical "intent" of the 1897
act, according to the district court. 9 Under the district court decision, the Utes did
not regain jurisdiction over all the lands of the "old" Uncompahgre Reservation. lo
The court next turned its attention to the question of whether or not Congress
intended to disestablish the Uintah Reservation under the terms of the 1905 Indian
Appropriations Act. The court determined that Congress did not. The 1902 Indian
Appropriations Act stated:
The Secretary of the Interior [shall make] ... said allotments ... prior to
October first, nineteen hundred and three, on which date all tJie
unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public
domain.ll (Emphasis added).
Despite the blatant use of the term "restored to the public domain," due to the
legislative history of the statute, ambiguities surrounded the intended meaning of
Congress. On several occasions, during the congressional hearings on the bill,
congressmen referred to the "opening" of the reservation under the terms of the

9Ibid., 1106.
lonte court, however, did agree with the Utes that the "Hill Creek
Extension" remained intact as part of Ute lands. Organized as a grazing reserve for
the Utes, Congress added the Hill Creek Extension to the Uintah-Ouray Reservation
in March 1948. The lands making up the extension originally belonged to the "old"
Uncompahgre Reservation. The court stated that the purpose of the bill creating the
reserve "was 'to enlarge the Uinath-Ouray Reservation' ... and, indeed, that is what
the 1948 Act did." The court did not relate many details concerning this point since
the defense had never contested the existence of the Hill Creek Extension as part of
"Indian Country." For more information see: Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah,
521 F. Supp. 1072, 1109 (D. Utah 1981); Chapter I, p. 28.
An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department, Statutes at Large, 32, chap. 888, 263 (1902).
11
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12
1902 act. The tribe's argument rested heavily on these repeated references to the
term "opening." The tribe contended that the references to "opening" the
reservation mitigated the plain meaning of the 1902 act; a reservation that Congress
opened, the tribe proclaimed, was not abolished, disestablished, terminated, or
diminished. 13
The court sided with the Utes, but under slightly different reasoning. The
court turned to the legal precedent forwarded in the 1973 Supreme Court case of
Mattz v. Arnett. In the Mattz decision the Supreme Court held that the "opening"
#

of the Klamath River Indian Reservation to allotment had not terminated the
reservation, and that the land within the reservation boundaries remained "Indian
country. ,,14 The Supreme Court in the Mattz decision stated that "congressional
determination to terminate [an Indian reservation] must be expressed on the face of
the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. ,,15
The court maintained that the Uintah Reservation was not opened under the
1902 language prescribing "the restoration to the public domain" of allotted lands.

12"Opening" phraseology slipped into amendments made to the 1902 act by a
joint resolution dated 19 June 1902. The resolution reserved a tract of grazing land
for the Utes "before any of said lands are opened to disposition under any public
land law." For further discussion see: Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 Supp.
1072, 1116 (D. Utah 1981).
13Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 Supp. 1072, 1122 (D. Utah 1981).
14Mattz v. Arnett, 481.
lSIbid., 487.
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According to the court, it opened under the 1905 Indian Appropriations Act, which
expressly provided:
That said unallotted lands ... shall be disposed of under the general
provisions of the homestead and town-site laws of the United States
and opened to settlement. 16 (Emphasis added) .
The imprimatur of the 1905 act secured the opening of the lands. The 1905
legislation plainly stipulated the method in which this would occur. Congress did
not open the reservation under all land laws, but only the homestead and townsite
laws. In this respect, the language of the 1905 act closely resembled the legislation
;

that "opened" the Klamath River Reservation in Mattz. 17
In further support of the Ute position on this issue, the court cited the fact
that the historical record (based primarily on congressional hearings held on the
1905 act) as to the "intent" of Congress did not support the position to terminate the
Ute reservation. Congress did not employ clear termination phraseology in the 1905
act; in fact, "it was purposely rejected," the court stated. IS

16An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department and Fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with Various Indian
Tribes for the Fiscal Year Ending June Thirtieth, Nineteen Hundred and Six,
and for Other Purposes, Statutes at Large, 33, sec. 3, 1069 (1905).

17The act of 17 June 1892 that opened the Klamath River Reservation in
California provided that "all the lands embraced in what was the Klamath River
Reservation ... [are] declared to be subject to settlement, entry, and purchase under
the laws of the United States granting homestead rights." Mattz v. Arnett, 93.
18The district court recalled that in 1905 the Senate had altered the 1905
Indian Appropriations Act sent to it by the House. The "public domain" language
vanished from the final version of the bill when the Senate deleted that phrase and
replaced it with the more limited statement that subjected the opening to "the
homestead and townsite laws of the United States." During Senate hearings the
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The executive branch of the federal government apparently understood the
purpose of the 1905 congressional act to mean continued reservation status. The
district court noted that the Presidential Proclamation of 1905, which opened the
Uintah Reservation under executive authority, paralleled the terms of the 1905
congressional act. 19 It provided that "all the unallotted lands in said
reservation ... [will] be opened to entry ... under the general provisions of the
homestead and townsite laws of the United States." 20
The court's ruling on this matter tilted toward the curious, considering that
;

the court's basis for the disestablishment of the Uncompahgre Reservation rested on
the opinion that a previous act of Congress provided the historical intent of a
subsequent act. Yet, when deciding on the legal. status of the Uintah Reservation,
the court discarded the relevance of the initial legislation (in this instance the 1902
Indian Appropriations Act), which dealt with that particular subject. The court's
ruling appeared to be fractured.

remarks of individual senators manifested the upper house's intent in passing the
bill. Senator Thomas Kearns (R-Utah) stated that he "would like to cut out all the
House amendments." Senator Reed Smoot (R-Utah), sponsor of the Senate version
of the appropriations act, assured Kearns: "That is what my bill says ... that there
shall be no lands settled there except under the homestead and townsite entry. "
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of Indian Affairs, Indian Appropriations Bill,
1906, 58th Cong., 3rd. sess., 22 June 1905, 29-30; Ute Indian Tribe v. State of
Utah, 521 Supp. 1072, 1131 (D. Utah 1981).
l~e 1905 act placed sole authority for opening the reservation on the
president. He alone was granted such power. The 1905 act simply outlined the
provisions for opening the Uintah Reservation.

20Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 Supp. 1072, 1132 (D. Utah 1981).

91
Lastly, the district court addressed the issue of the reserved forest lands. The
court found that the express wording and the legislative history of the 1905 Indian
Appropriations Act justified the conclusion that Congress diminished the Uintah
Indian Reservation by the withdrawal of timber lands for national forest purposes. 21
The act provided:
The President is hereby authorized to set apart and reserve as an
addition to the Uintah Forest Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, and
regulations governing forest reserves ... such portion of the lands within
the Uintah Indian Reservation as he considers necessary. 22
An earlier 1891 act empowered the president to "set apart and resJrve, in any State

or Territory ... public land ... as public reservations.,,23 The 1891 act also defined
national forests as public reservations.
Very little legal precedent existed to guide the court on this matter. The
related body of Indian law pertinent to the Ute case did not provide enlightenment
about the impact of a withdrawal of lands for national forest purposes on the
boundaries of an Indian reservation. The Ute lawsuit proved unique in this respect.
Thus, the court elucidated its own distinct line of reasoning. The court stated that
the federal government had administered national forests by law, regulation, and
bureaucratic structure separate from those governing Indian affairs. Traditionally,
the secretary of the interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs administered the trust

21Ibid., 1136.
An Act Making Appropriations for Current and Contingent Expenses of
the Indian Department, Statutes at Large, 33, sec. 3, 1069-70 (1905).
22

23Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 Supp. 1072, 1132 (D. Utah 1981).

92

responsibility of the federal government for the management of Indian timber
reserves. The agency managed the lands included in the Uintah Forest Reserve
wholly apart from those in the remainder of the Uintah Reservation. The fact that
the Department of Agriculture supervised the lands in question buttressed the court's
conclusion that the national forest lands had been withdrawn for separate purposes.
"While it is true that Congress may ... diminish an Indian reservation by restoring the
lands to the public domain, it is also true that Congress may diminish an Indian
reservation by withdrawing ... lands for an inconsistent purpose," tlJe court

•

maintained. Congress had disestablished the forest lands from the Uintah
Reservation.
Overall, the district court decision excluded approximately 2.4 million acres
from the Ute jurisdictional request. Judge Jenkins's finding confined the Ute
reservation boundaries to the territory of the original Uintah Valley Reservation.
The district co,urt, however, did not settle the lawsuit simply by defining the
geographical boundaries of the Ute reservation. Jenkins's finding simply delineated
the boundaries in which Indian jurisdiction might apply. Because the Indians sought
jurisdictional control over the disputed area, Jenkins had to clarify the extent of Ute
jurisdiction over the reservation.

His determinations on this matter had far-

reaching legal ramifications, particularly with concern to Indian civil jurisdiction.
The district court handled the volatile issues of Ute criminal jurisdiction and
hunting regulation rights in short order. The district court determination hinged on

two antecedent Supreme Court rulings.
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Because the Supreme Court had previously

dealt with each of these subjects separately in the cases Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe and Montana v. United States,24 the district court dismissed the Ute
claims. The higher court decisions took precedent. Accordingly, Oliphant
disallowed Ute criminal juhsdiction over non-Indians on the reservation and
Montana limited tribal game regulation to Indian trust lands. 2s
The applicable range of Ute civil authority required closer examination by
the district court. Once again implementing the precepts set forth in Montana v.

24The 1978 Oliphant case arose out of a dispute originating on the Port
Madison Reservation in the state of Washington. During the Chief Seattle Days
celebration, several non-Indians were arrested for criminal disturbances. Over the
objections of the non-Indian defendants, the tribal court assumed jurisdiction and
tried the offenders, finding each guilty. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the
convictions were reversed when the Court determined that the tribal court did not
have jurisdiction in the case. In delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist found that only Congress could confer tribal courts with
jurisdiction over offenses committed by non-Indians on reservations and Congress
had not given such power to the Suquamish Indians. In Montana v. United States,
the Supreme Court found that ownership of the Big Horn River bed (and its fish),
located within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation, passed to the State of
Montana when the federal government granted the territory its statehood. Therefore,
Montana retained regulatory power over non-Indian hunting and fishing on the
reservation. Prior to the decision, the Crows had prohibited non-Indian hunting and
fishing on their reservation. Likewise, the State of Montana had tried to assert
regulatory control over non-Indians within the boundaries of the reservation. For
further information see: Montana v. United States 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Wunder,
Retained by the People, 182-83; Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law,
50-51; Burton, American Indian Water Rights, 45; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American
Justice, 180-81.
25Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1146 (D. Utah
1981).
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United States, Judge Jenkins stated that the Supreme Court had previously
articulated the relevant scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians within
"Indian country." In Montana, Justice Potter Stewart affirmed Indian tribes'
inherent sovereign power to exercise certain forms of civil jurisdiction over nonIndians living on their reservations, including over non-Indian fee lands. In broad
terms, he stated that tribes could "regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means" the economic activities of non-Indians who entered "consenual
relationships" with the tribe. Stewart added that a tribe could also. retain inherent
#

power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians "when that conduct
threatens ... the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe." Potter's decision led to Jenkins's conclusion that the Supreme Court had
"expressly confirmed the power of Indian tribes to tax non-Indians entering the
Reservation to engage in economic activity. ,,26 Thus, the Utes won a wide range of
civil powers over the Uintah-Ouray Reservation. Jenkins's determination awarding
the Utes increased civil power provided the Indians with their most important
triumph in the district court decision.
Thirty-five days after the district court released its verdict, the Utes appealed
the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Although the Indians had gained
some substantial concessions, the district court judgment ruled against the Ute

26Robert S. Halliday, "Utes, Non-Indians to Contest Ruling," Salt Lake City
Tribune, 5 July 1981, sec. B, p. 1; Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp.
1072, 1155, 1156 (D. Utah 1981).
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position on what the tribe considered the two most crucial points. Under Jenkins's
finding, Congress had diminished the Uncompahgre Reservation and the national
forest lands were disestablished subject to the 1905 act. Therefore, the court
decision granted the tribe jurisdiction over only 21 % (626,474 acres) of the lands it
claimed. This outcome formed the basis for a Ute appeal.
The State of Utah also appealed to the circuit court. The expansive terms of
the district court's judgment on Indian civil jurisdiction engendered anxiety among
the white residents living on the Uintah-Ouray Reservation. They leared that the
rights afforded the Utes by Judge Jenkins's decision might lead to tribal taxation and
business licensing of non-Indians. They hoped the appellate court would confine the
reservation boundaries to Indian-owned trust lands and, likewise, restrict Ute civil
power to those areas. Neil Domgaard, Uintah County Commissioner, articulated
basin officials' distress: "The cloud that's still over us is the Indians' right to
license and zone. That would be serious. "27 . Both parties had to wait over four
years for the final circuit court determination.
On 17 September 1985, the circuit court handed down its decision reversing
the ruling on two of the three points by the district court. In a 5-2 majority, the
circuit court held that the 1894 and 1897 Indian Appropriations Acts had not
diminished or disestablished the Uncompahgre Reservation; the 1905 Indian
Appropriations Act had not diminished the Uintah Reservation; and the withdrawal

27Halliday, "Utes, Non-Indians to Contest Ruling," Salt Lake City Tribune,

p.2.
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of national forest lands under the 1905 act had not diminished the Uintah
Reservation. Contrary to the district court's ruling, the decision marked a landmark
victory for the Ute Indians.
The circuit court stated that although the district court decided that the
reservation had been disestablished, it did not have the advantage of evaluating the
issues in light of the 1984 Supreme Court ruling in the case Solem v. Bartlett. The
precedent forwarded in Solem proves crucial in understanding the circuit court's
reversal. The court relied heavily on Solem to justify its conclusiol}s. Solem
recognized that Congress passed a number of surplus land acts at the turn of the
century in response to both pressure for new lands for white settlement and the
prevailing sentiment that endorsed Indians' assimilation into American society.
Each of these land acts represented "the product of a unique set of tribal negotiations
and legislative compromise.,,28 Solem directed courts to consider each piece of
legislation dealing with Indian affairs individually. The Solem decision clarified that
in only two types of situations should courts find that Congress intended to
disestablish an Indian reservation. The first occurred if Congress used explicit
language of cession in an "opening" act. Secondly, courts could find
disestablishment only when events surrounding a surplus land act unequivocally
revealed a widely-held, concurrent understanding that the provisions of the bill
would shrink or terminate the affected reservation. The Solem decision also stated:
When both an act and its legislative history fail to provide substantial
and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to diminish
28Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F. 2d. Supp. 1087, 1094 (1985).
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Indian lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude for the Indian
tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place. 29
With these dicta in mind, the court addressed the three issues raised in the
case. When the circuit court handed down its decision, the justices recognized that
the disestablishment question surrounding the Uncompahgre Reservation posed a
difficult analytical problem. However, the circuit court finding presented a more
unified and coherent line of reasoning than that of the district court. The majority
opinion and concurring opinions of the court focused on the language of the 1894
~

Indian Appropriations Act, which called for the restoration of unallotted lands to the
"public domain." The court held that "public domain" language standing alone
proved insufficient to support a finding of congressional intent to disestablish the
reservation.
The fact that much of the text of the 1894 act, including the "public domain"
language, vanished in the 1897 act, only heightened the ambiguity of the term when
replaced with the statement that required all unused land to "be open for ... entry
under all the land laws of the United States." In conclusion, the court stated:
Given such ambiguous circumstances, it is impossible to derive any
clear indication of whether Congress intended merely to open the
reservation or to disestablish it. Under Solem we are bound to resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the tribe. 30 - The fact that the district court and the circuit court ruled differently on this issue
(the district court finding intent to terminate reservation status and the circuit court

29Solem v. Bartlett, 104 U.S. 1167 (1984).
30Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F. 2d. Supp. 1087, 1098 (1985).
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determining no clear intent) exposed the difficulties and confusion that arose from
attempting to uncover congressional intent.
Next, the circuit court ruled on the status of the Uintah Reservation. The
circuit court agreed in part with tbe district court on this matter and upheld the
ruling that Congress did not diminish the Uintah Reservation by passage of the 1905
Indian Appropriations Act. The circuit court did, however, disagree with the
district court on the point of the withdrawal of the national forest lands.
On this issue, the court reasserted the same principles it used
in ruling on the
t
Uncompahgre Reservation. Citing the portion of the 1905 act that provided "the
President .. .is authorized to set apart and reserve .. .lands within the Uintah
Reservation as he considers necessary," the court held that no language in the law
amounted to explicit language of cession. Nor did it establish a "total surrender of
tribal interests. ,,31 According to its decision, the circuit court clearly believed that
the goals of the national forest system as of 1905 (including management of timber
resources and the protection of fish and game) could have been achieved without
removing jurisdiction from the Ute tribe. 32 This pronouncement did not require the
court, it believed, to conclude that Congress withdrew the forest reserve land from
the Uintah Reservation. The Utes retained jurisdiction over the one million acres of
forest reserve land.

31Ibid., 1090.
32Ibid., 1099.

99
As a result of the circuit court's decision, the Utes won jurisdiction rights
over nearly 2.9 million acres of their original lands. The ruling capped nearly nine
years of litigation and quadrupled the size of the reservation, giving the Utes control
of mineral-rich desert, forest, and range lands about the size of the state of
Delaware. The reconstituted boundaries of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation,
encompassing over four million acres, made it the second-largest Indian reservation
in the United States.
Because the circuit court failed to address the issue of Indian jurisdiction
;

rights in its the decision, the most important outcome of the litigation resulted from
the court's silence. Without a written reversal on Judge Jenkins's jurisdictional
findings, the appellate court essentially supported the district court's findings and
extended tribal civil power over the expanded reservation area. The circuit court's
determination of the reservation boundaries defined the area that Ute civil
jurisdiction affected. Therefore, although Indian criminal authority and hunting
jurisdiction remained greatly restricted, the Utes obtained further legal support for
the vast taxing and land use authority forwarded them by the district court decision.
On 1 December 1986, the United States Supreme Court sustained the circuit

court decision when it refused to hear the case on appeal from the State of Utah.
The high court's denial stunned the white residents of the Uintah Basin. Many
whites reacted with anger and trepidation. "It's hard to figure the court system out.
If it keeps going like this we could all end up back on Plymouth Rock with the rest
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of the country owned by the Indians, " declared Duchesne County Commissioner
Ted Kappen. Roosevelt resident Dean Frandsen's comments reflected the deep
indignation felt by many and directed at the Utes: "They never got the name
'Indian trader' for nothing. They'll be back after more. "33
White citizens of eastern Utah voiced a profusion of concerns, the most
prominent of which centered on state and basin officials' worries that the Utes might
attempt to levy a severance tax on oil and mineral leases within the reservation
boundaries. In 1985, the state of Utah received over forty-million dollars in
#

severance taxes from those sources. Officials also objected to the notion that the
Tribal Business Council could decide various local matters without white consent.
"The Indians can vote for us, but we can't vote for them. That's taxation without
representation and that's unconstitutional," pronounced Duchesne County
Commissioner Alton Moon.34
The Utes tried to mollify non-Indian concerns. Claiming that non-Indian
fears were unfounded, Ute Tribal Council Chairman Lester Chapoose stated, "We
[Indians and whites] have co-existed in this area for more than 100 years. Nothing
has changed in that time and I don't think things will change now. "3S The Utes said

33Paul Rolly, "Utes Win Control of Eastern Utah Land," Salt Lake City
Tribune, 7 December 1986, sec. B, p. 1-2; Brett DelPorto, "Ruling Giving Utes
Control of Land Troubles Residents," Salt Lake City Deseret News, 2 December
1986, sec. B, p. 1.
34DeIPorto, "Ruling Troubles Residents," Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 2.
3sPaui Rolly and Christopher Smart, "Ruling Favoring Utes Leaves
Duchesne Nervous, " Salt Lake City Tribune, 7 December 1986, sec. B, p. 3.
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they only desired what they believed always belonged to them: the right to assert
jurisdiction over their own people within the boundaries of the original reservation.
For nearly three years, the tribe exercised jurisdictional power over the
reservation lands with no legal challenge. Then, in 1988, a seemingly insignificant
event occurred, the arrest of Myton resident Robert Hagen. State officials arrested
Hagen, an Indian, but not a Ute, near Myton in April 1988 for distribution of
marijuana. He pleaded guilty to the charge. But two years later, he asked to
withdraw his guilty plea, saying that the white man's court did not have jurisdiction
i

over him because Myton fell within the reservation boundaries as defined by the
10th Circuit Court's decision. 36
The case eventually reached the Utah Supreme Court, which ruled that the
area in question had been returned to the "public domain" by the 1902 Indian
Appropriations Act and by the homesteading laws signed by President Theodore
Roosevelt, under the authority granted him by the 1905 Indian Appropriations Act.
The Utah Supreme Court ruling once again raised the issue of congressional intent.
Because the Utah Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the 10th Circuit
Court's decision six years earlier, the United States Supreme Court issued a writ of
certiorarj37 and now agreed to hear arguments on the case. With a 7-2 decision

36Marianne Funk, "Supreme Court Deals Blow to Indians in Uintah Basin,"
Salt Lake City Deseret News, 24 February 1994, sec. A, p. 1.
37A writ of certiorari is a common law writ issued by a superior court to a
lower court, commanding the latter to certify and return to the former a particular
case record so that the higher court may inspect the proceedings for irregularities or
errors. Gifis, Dictionary of Legal Terms, 67.

102
handed down on 23 February 1994 the Court effectively ended the eighteen-year-old
dispute over jurisdicti9n of the lands. The Supreme Court turned control of the
lands back to the state and local governments.
In a stunning reversal, the Supreme Court held that the operative language of
the 1902 Indian Appropriations Act superseded that of the 1905 act. In delivering
the opinion of the Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated that the "public
. . domain" language of the 1902 law evidenced "a congressional purpose to terminate
reservation status." The Court ignored the obvious deletion of the. "public domain"

•

wording in the 1905 statute. More dubious, however, was the Court's assertion that
the structure of the statutes--each contained similar provisions--required that the
1902 and 1905 acts be read together. According to the Court, this meant that
Congress "clearly viewed" the 1902 legislation as the basic building block for the
1905 act, resulting in disestablishment of the reservation. When considering that
both the district court and the circuit court had found that the 1905 act took
precedence over the 1902 legislation, the bewildering and questionable nature of the
Supreme Court ruling is magnified. 38
The Supreme Court did not rest its decision on this analysis alone, however.
In actuality, the Court assigned much more relevance to a different consideration.
Justice O'Connor stated that congressional intent to diminish the reservation was
exhibited by the fact that nearly 85% of the present-day Uintah Valley residents
(over 18,000 people) were non-Indians. O'Connor stated:

38Hagen v. Utah, 858 U.S. 925 (1994).
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When an area is predominantly populated by non-Indians with only a
few surviving pockets of Indian allotments, finding that the land
remains in 'Indian country' seriously burdens the administration of
state and local government.... A contrary conclusion would seriously
disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area. 39
The Supreme Court shifted the focus of the legal argument away from the issue of
congressional intent and instead favored the doctrine of balanced interests.
For this reason, the high court's decision was astonishing, especially in light
of the Court's earlier support of the circuit court's ruling and its reliance on
congressional intent as the most important criteria for deciding the case. The
;

Supreme Court's reversal marked a notable departure from the reasoning used by
the two lower federal courts and relegated congressional intent to a secondary
position. When the Court gave more significance to weighing state interests against
federal and tribal interests than to the issue of intent, it destroyed all predictability
attributable to the law in the Ute case. Until the Supreme Court's decision, intent
had formed the basis for legal judgment.
Although only two justices, Harry Blackmun and David Souter, dissented,
the debate over the issue of congressional intent versus state interests remained
bitter. In a lengthy and vitriolic dissent, Blackmun said the majority failed to find
clear language in the historical record that the lands in contention were meant to be
placed in the public domain: "The court relies on a single, ambiguous phrase in an
act that never became effective ... to conclude that Congress must have intended to
3~ony

Semerad, "Ute Tribe Loses Big in Court Battle, But Insists the Turf
War Isn't Over," Salt Lake City Tribune, 24 February 1994, sec. A, p. 1; Hagen v.
Utah, 858 U.S. 925 (1994).
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diminish the Uintah Valley Reservation. ,,40 In doing so, Blackmun wrote, the court
had neglected its duty to interpret legal ambiguities liberally in favor of Indians to
uphold the federal plenary power of Indian tribes. In vituperation, Blackmun
quoted former Chief Justice John Marshall and stated, "Great nations, like great
men, should keep their promises. ,,41
The high court ruling gave state and local officials solid regulatory control
over taxation, wildlife, business licensing, liquor laws, and other governmental
matters. The decision also acknowledged the State of Utah's right to reinstitute
;

taxes on the basin's mineral reserves. The judgment brought relief to many of the
18,000 non-Indians of eastern Utah. "This takes a cloud of uncertainty away from
our lives ... Now we can start addressing some of the real issues of our area," stated
basin businesswoman Beverly Evans. 42 Utah Attorney General Jan Graham
proclaimed, "Now all the people in the basin can return to the stable and lawful
environment they deserve. ,,43
The Utes reacted with dismay and virulence to the ultimate outcome of their
lawsuit. In a written statement issued by the Tribal Business Committee, the Indians
asked: "Has the tribe been too trusting in its dealings with others? .. All that we

4oSemerad, "Ute Tribe Loses Big in Court Battle," Salt Lake City Tribune,

p. 1.
41Ibid.
42Jbid.
43 Pu

nk , "Supreme Court Deals Blow To Indians," Salt Lake City Deseret

News, p. 1.
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have asked of our neighbors is to respect our sovereign powers." Although the Utes
had lost their legal fight, ex-tribal leader Clifford Duncan promised the battle had
not ended: "There's going to be a lot of resentment from the tribe. The federal
courts are at war with the Indian tribes. It's a war that exists and will never end. ,,44

44Semerad, "Ute Tribe Looses Big," Salt Lake City Tribune, p. 1.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: "REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAYS"

As much as any other dispute of the modern era, the Ute case illuminates the
inherent problems surrounding Indian jurisdiction law. Most of the problems in
these cases stem from the split reasoning employed by the judiciary. The courts'
arbitrary utilization of the separate doctrines of congressional intent and balanced
interests reveals the judicial confusion that plagues this body of la\v.
The federal court system's apparent capriciousness ultimately undermines the
effectiveness of the law. The constant waffling of the courts in their commitment to
one doctrine over the other has destabilizing effects. The current trend in this body
of law provides no guidance to justices confused about the overriding importance of
congressional intent or demographics in deciding a particular case. Rather than
define a clear position to take in jurisdiction disputes, the courts have obfuscated the
issues so that consistency has nearly evaporated. By refusing to adhere to a given
principle, the courts .cannot provide a unified theory on how to resolve these cases.
Without specific guidelines, Indian jurisdictional law remains impotent.
The Ute case emphasizes one point in particular: Native American groups
face very little certainty when entering litigation over jurisdiction disputes. In Ute
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, two federal courts focused on the issue of
congressional intent, only to reach different conclusions from the same ambiguous
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history. The United States Supreme Court then underplayed the intent question and
gave more import to the balanced interests doctrine. In other jurisdiction cases,
courts may base their decisions on a different combination of factors.
In the midst of the legal controversy in the Uintah Basin, the federal courts
were given the opportunity to provide an enduring statement about the extent of
Indian jurisdictional control over reservation lands, clearing up much of the
uncertainty that has traditionally surrounded this complicated body of law. Instead,
the courts proved indeterminate and unpredictable. They confused the issues so

•

thoroughly that they equivocated the meaning of the law.
Increasing contact, even to the point of daily interaction, between white
communities and Indian tribes guarantees future courts must.struggle to articulate a
definitive stance on jurisdiction rights. .To accomplish this, the courts must move
away from case by case determinations that emphasize the importance of varying
factors in each instance. Only by articulating a standard test for deciding
jurisdiction cases can the courts effectuate stability in this area of the law.
Although important, these esoteric legal issues do not fully elucidate the
dynamics encompassing the Ute case. The most vexing problems in the Ute
jurisdiction dispute trace to people. The long history of Indian/white conflict over
the lands of the Uintah Basin imprinted lasting animosities in each group. When
confronted with the legal crisis over the Ute Law and Order Code, cultural
misunderstandings harbored by both Indians and non-Indians produced bitterness
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that destroyed any hope for peaceful reconciliation and made litigation unavoidable.

Because of these entrenched feelings, the legal outcome for the people of the Uintah
Basin carried larger connotations that stretched beyond the legal question of Indian
jurisdiction rights.
Whites held their own expectations of the law, because they had practiced
jurisdictional control over the disputed lands for many years before the Utes
implemented the Law and Order Code. Whites grew accustomed to their own local
governmental authority, based on the precepts of representative goyernment. Many
.

#

of the concerns forwarded by whites about Ute control were legitimate. Under the
provisions of the code, whites could not vote for members of the Ute tribal
government. Many white residents resented the possibility of being taxed by a
government in which they had no voice. The fact that whites outnumbered the Utes
eight to one in the Uintah Basin further incited their indignation over the lack of
representation. The subsequent circuit court decision that upheld Ute jurisdictional
power reinforced white resentment.
The Supreme Court's decision removed what whites considered a direct
threat to their lifestyle. The Court's decision quelled fears and provided security to
the white population of eastern Utah. Although ultimately triumphant in the legal
battie, the whites' victory was predicated on negative feelings. The protracted legal
process had elicited rancor and ill-will for both sides.
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For the Utes, the Supreme Court decision represented one more betrayal in a
long succession of broken promises. To them, the case provided yet another
example of white subjugation and encroachment that the tribe had unsuccessfully
struggled against for, at least, 150 years. The Utes believed that the Court's ruling
greatly impinged on their sovereignty and signified a loss of control over their own
destiny. Above all else, the Utes felt cheated out of their lands. The emphatic
remarks of Larry Cesspooch, editor of the Ute Bulletin, best illustrate these
convictions and capture the extent of Ute bitterness and despondel)cy in the
aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision:
Its ridiculous for a non-Indian to say they know how the Ute Tribe
feels ... They can't possibly know. They've never had their land taken
away, their culture stripped from them, or been forced to fit into
another way of life ... no amount of money ... will ever replace the lands
taken from the Ute People .... Today, anyone driving through the
Strawberry Valley can see what the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction
Decision has taken. Every time Ute Tribal Members drive to the
Wasatch Front, we will be reminded of what was taken in 1994
by ... the State of Utah. Regardless of what the United States Supreme
Court or [the] State of Utah says, the Original Uintah Valley
Reservation and other Ute lands taken, still possess the Ute Spirit.
The bones of our ancestors are still buried there, nothing can change
that. No man can take the Ute Spirit away from the land or take the
land from our hearts. 1
In general terms, the purpose of the law is to provide resolution. But, in the
Ute case, it produced the opposite effect. Legal redress intensified hostilities
between Indians and whites. In the Ute case, the long history of Indian/white
conflict instilled resentments that the legal process resurrected. Because each group

lEditorial, "How Can Any Non-Indian Possibly Know How the Tribe
Feels," Ute Bulletin, 8 March 1994.
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felt justified in its legal cause, each placed unreasonable expectations on the legal
system as the sole means of solving its problems. Based on the animosities and
misconceptions shared between the two groups, neither recognized that the law, with
its numerous defects, could not adequately address all the problems that confronted
Ute/white relations in the Uintah Basin. Whatever the ultimate ruling, the law could
not lay ill-feelings to rest either.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision may have even failed in resolving the
singular issue of jurisdiction rights. By the fall of 1994, the State <;>f Utah and the

•

Utes found themselves back in Judge Jenkins's courtroom. A new dispute had
arisen in which the two parties contested the meaning of the Supreme Court's
ruling. The Utes asked the district court to place a permanent injunction on state
and local governments from imposing their interpretation of the Supreme Court
decision on tribal members. The Utes claimed that the decision only restricted Ute
jurisdiction over homestead and townsite lands. The state disagreed, stating that the
ruling provided it jurisdiction control over the entire Uintah-Ouray Reservation.
This latest disagreement threw the argument back into the federal courts. 2
Given the lack of resolution that court action so far has provided in the Ute
jurisdiction dispute, and the numerous other problems facing whites and Indians in
the Uintah Basin, the Ute case offers a larger realization. As interaction between

2Larry Cesspooch, "Tribe Only Lost Jurisdiction Over Homestead Land, "
Ute Bulletin, 26 April 1994; Larry Cesspooch, "First Attempts by State to Exercise
Hagen Jurisdiction," Ute Bulletin, 10 May 1994; Larry Cesspooch, "Give Them an
Inch and They'll Take Uncompahgre," Ute Bulletin, 27 September 1994.
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Indians and whites increases in the modern world, both groups must look past the
law to find answers to their problems. The law cannot fully address the abundant
and assorted issues that confront contemporary Indian/white relations. More
importantly, legal decisions will seldom satisfy both sides.
Even as the Ute case promises to drag on for many more years, continuing to
reopen the wounds of the past, it speaks to broader issues in American Indian legal
history. With an understanding of the larger implications of the law in the Ute case,
one realizes that an examination of Indian law demands realistic historical insight.
~

The battle for jurisdictional control over the disputed lands of the Uintah Basin
provides more than a study of legal doctrine applicable in one case. It suggests that
to understand contemporary Indian/white relations, we should recognize the limited
role of the law in resolving land conflicts.
The Ute story constitutes but one event in the astoundingly complex history
of Indian/white relationships. By unraveling the intense and intricate forces that
lead to litigation and placing legal decisions in the context of human lives we can
gain a better comprehension of the dynamics of Indian/white relations in the latetwentieth century. Scholars must assess the utility of Indian law in this light.
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